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The harms of overcriminalization are usually thought of in a particular
way-that the proliferation of criminal laws leads to increasing and
inconsistent criminal enforcement and adjudication. For example, an offender
commits an unethical or illegal act and, because of the overwhelming depth and
breadth of the criminal law, becomes subject to too much prosecutorial
discretion and faces disparate enforcement or punishment. But there is an
additional, possibly more pernicious, harm of overcriminalization. Drawing
from the fields of criminology and behavioral ethics, this Article makes the case
that overcriminalization actually increases the commission of criminal
behavior itself, particularly by white collar offenders. This occurs because
overcriminalization, by lessening the legitimacy of the criminal law, fuels
offender rationalizations. Rationalizations are part of the psychological process
necessary for the commission of crime-they allow offenders to square their self-
perception as "good people" with the illegal behavior they are contemplating,
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thereby allowing the behavior to go forward. Overcriminalization, then, is more
than a post-act concern. It is inherently criminogenic because it facilitates some
of the most prevalent and powerful rationalizations used by would-be offenders.
Put simply, overcriminalization is fostering the very conduct it seeks to
eliminate. This phenomenon is on display in the recently decided Supreme
Court case Yates v. United States. Using Yates as a backdrop, this Article
presents a new paradigm of overcriminalization and its harms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently decided Yates v. United States.'
Yates has garnered a lot of attention because of its somewhat odd
subject matter. The case concerns a small-town Florida fisherman
convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, the "anti-shredding provision" of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which made it a crime to destroy a "record,
document, or tangible object" with the intent to obstruct a federal
investigation.2 Sarbanes-Oxley, of course, was not originally aimed at
135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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fishermen. The law was passed to curb corporate malfeasance in the
aftermath of the massive accounting scandals-Enron, WorldCom,
Global Crossing-of the early 2000s. And the fisherman, John Yates,
was not found guilty of cooking his company's books or lying to his
shareholders-he had neither. Instead, Yates was convicted of throwing
a crate of undersized red grouper overboard after a federal agent
inspecting his catch instructed him to keep the fish on ice until the boat
returned to port. A jury found that Yates destroyed "tangible objects"
as defined under the Act, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether Yates was
deprived of fair notice that the destruction of fish fell within the
meaning of § 1519.
Unsurprisingly, the popular media and legal commentators had
a lot of fun with Yates. It was quickly dubbed the "fishy SOX case,"3 and
pundits asked, among other things, whether there was "something fishy
in Sarbox land"4 and whether the government was "going overboard."5
The Justices also had a bit of fun. During oral argument, in what can
be described as a jovial, even riotous session, the litigants were
interrupted fifteen times by the gallery's laughter,6 most of which was
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes
a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede,
obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under
title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
3. Ellen Podgor, A Fishy SOX Case, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime blog/2014/04/sox-case-is-fishy.html
[http://perma.cclB6CT-4EPG]. See also Richard M. Re, Yates, A Fishy Case, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct.
29, 2014), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/10/yates-a-fishy-case.html
[http://perma.cc/TY7G-K767]; Dan Epstein, Fishy Business at the Supreme Court: Florida Capt.
John Yates' Sad Saga, Fox NEWS, (Nov. 05, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/11/05/
fishy-business-at-supreme-court-florida-capt-john-yates-sad-saga/ [http://perma.cc/Z38D-6VP9].
4. Bill Shepherd, Something Fishy in Sarbox Land, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bill-shepherd-something-fishy-in-sarbox-land- 1415145952
[http://perma.cc/JAP7-T2DG].
5. Paul F. Enzinna, Going Overboard? A Fishy Case of Obstruction, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
WATCH (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.whitecollarcrimewatch.com/2014/04/going-overboard-a-fish-
case-of-obstruction/ [http://perma.cclJ3GG-6QBR]. See also, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Oversized Frauds,
Undersized Fish, and Deconstruction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 17 (2014),
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2014/06/Larkin.Oversized.pdf [http://perma.c/ 878K-
RQSM].
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No.
13-7451); Todd Haugh, Guest SCOTUS Argument Analysis: 'Rish are Apparently Funny ... and





the product of judicial wisecracks and one-liners.7 For example, Justice
Kennedy closed the argument by wryly suggesting, "Perhaps Congress
should have called this the Sarbanes-Oxley Grouper Act."8
Despite the levity, Yates is a serious case that presents a serious
issue: overcriminalization. Definitions vary,9 but overcriminalization
can be described as the proliferation of criminal statutes and
overlapping regulations that impose harsh penalties for unremarkable
conduct (i.e., conduct that should be governed by civil statute or no
statute at all). Those most closely studying the phenomenon regard it
as a vexing problem of the criminal justice system; some say it is the
most pressing problem in criminal law today. 10
Indeed, we now know that is why the Supreme Court took the
case. Although Yates offered "no circuit split, no transgression of
Supreme Court precedent, and no special national interest justifying
immediate resolution," cert was granted." Yates, supported by a host
of amici, put the issue of overcriminalization squarely before the Court,
arguing that applying Sarbanes-Oxley to fishing was "absurd"12 and
contending that the "evils" of overcriminalization weighed in favor of
overturning his conviction.13 This line of argument seemed to resonate
7. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 6, at 30. An illustrative exchange went as follows:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You make him [Yates] sound like a mob boss or
something. I mean, he was caught --
(Laughter.)
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The fish were -- how many inches short of permitted were
the fish?
MR. MARTINEZ: The fish were -- it varied fish by fish, Your Honor.
(Laughter.)
Id.
8. Id. at 54.
9. See infra Section II.A. See also, Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM.
U. L. REV. 703, 716 (2005) (defining overcriminalization as "the abuse of the supreme force of a
criminal justice system-the implementation of crimes or imposition of sentences without
justification"); Zach Dillon, Foreword: Symposium on Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 525, 525 (2012) (citing Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967), for the definition of overcriminalization as "the
use of the criminal law to pursue public policy objectives for which it is poorly suited").
10. Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537,
537 n.1, 538 (2012) (citing William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 507 (2001) and quoting DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAw 3 (2008)).
11. Re, supra note 3.
12. Transcript, supra note 6, at 22.
13. Brief for Eighteen Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner at
2, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451) (identifying two "chief' evils: "the
quantitative expansion of federal law to include countless, and often redundant, criminal
provisions"; and the qualitative breadth of those provisions). It should be noted that the author
was a signatory to this brief. Id. at A3. See also Reply Brief of Petitioner at 24-25, Yates v. United
1194
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with the Court. At least six Justices asked questions about
overcriminalization's impact on Yates's arrest and conviction,14 and
Justice Kennedy, the Court's regular swing vote, commented that the
argument had "considerable force."15
The Court's opinion reveals the same. Although there was a
surprising mix of Justices making up the 5-4 plurality that overturned
Yates's conviction, the issue of overcriminalization bound the individual
opinions together.16 The last few paragraphs of Justice Kagan's dissent
candidly summed this up. She wrote that the "the real issue" of the case
was "overcriminalization and excessive punishment in the U.S. Code."17
While she differed with the plurality on how to read § 1519 and whether
the courts are the proper place to curb excessive criminalization and
punishment, she ardently agreed that "broad and undifferentiated"
statutes with "too-high maximum penalties, which give prosecutors too
much leverage and sentencers too much discretion"-the essence of
overcriminalization-make bad law.18 She went further, stating that
"§1519 is unfortunately not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper
pathology in the federal criminal code."19
While that is almost assuredly true, and the Court was right to
take a case so directly addressing the issue of overcriminalization, the
Court's ultimate analysis was incomplete. The Justices, as well as the
litigants, viewed the harms associated with overcriminalization in the
typical way. They approached overcriminalization through the
paradigm that links the proliferation of criminal laws to increasing and
inconsistent post-act criminal enforcement and adjudication.
States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451) (arguing that the government's reading of the statute
"would bring a whole host of innocent remedial measures or otherwise run-of-the-mill inventory
management situations within the purview of the anti-shredding provision").
14. Transcript, supra note 6, at 24-54 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg,
Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Scalia asked questions concerning the breadth of § 1519, how it
interacted with overlapping obstruction statutes, the harshness of its twenty-year maximum
sentence, and the government's off-balance exercise of its charging discretion).
15. Id. at 5. To be fair, Justice Kennedy also raised concerns about Yates's reading of the
statute. Id.
16. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor,
found that §1519 did not apply to Yates's conduct because the statute's "tangible object" language
could not be read more expansively than an object "used to record or preserve information." Yates
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1079 (2015). To do otherwise, Justice Ginsburg wrote, would "cut
§ 1519 loose from its financial-fraud mooring." Id. Justice Alito, who served as the crucial vote via
his concurring opinion, found the issue a close one, but ultimately "tip[ped] the case in favor of
Yates." Id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy, dissented. She found the term "tangible object" to be "broad, but clear," covering all
physical objects of all kinds-fish included. Id. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 1100 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 1101.
19. Id.
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Overcriminalization's ills were seen as flowing from how criminal law
is applied after an offender's conduct occurs-whether, for example, an
offender is subject to too much prosecutorial discretion or faces
disparate punishment.20
While that paradigm is useful and the harms it identifies are
real, it is also too limited. Drawing from the fields of criminology and
behavioral ethics, this Article contends that overcriminalization's
harms are more expansive-temporally and substantively-than
typically understood. That is because overcriminalization actually
increases the commission of criminal behavior, particularly by white
collar offenders. Overcriminalization increases criminal behavior by
lessening the legitimacy of the criminal law, which fuels offender
rationalizations. Rationalizations are a key component in the
psychological process necessary for the commission of white collar
crime-without them offenders like Yates are unable to square their
self-perception as "good people" with the illegal behavior they are
contemplating, and therefore their criminal conduct does not go
forward.21 Overcriminalization, then, is more than a post-act concern.
It is inherently criminogenic because it facilitates some of the most
prevalent and powerful rationalizations used by would-be offenders,
completing the psychological circuit that allows for criminal violations.
Instead of deterring crime, overcriminalization fosters the very conduct
it seeks to eliminate. This phenomenon, which presents a new way of
understanding overcriminalization and its harms, is on display in
Yates. The case, therefore, offers a compelling and prominent vehicle
through which to explore the full scope of overcriminalization's
detriments.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of
overcriminalization and its typically understood harms. Part III argues
that there is an additional, possibly more pernicious harm in the way
overcriminalization impacts an offender's pre-act psychological process.
Relying on criminological and behavioral ethics research, this part
explains how rationalizations help foster criminal behavior and sets out
the most common ones used by white collar offenders, those most likely
20. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
519-20 (2001) (identifying mismatches in enforcement and adjudication as important
consequences of overcriminalization).
21. See generally Vikas Anand, Blake E. Ashforth & Mahendra Joshi, Business as Usual:
The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations, ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Nov.
2005, at 9, 10-17 (discussing how employees perpetrating corrupt acts engage in "rationalizing
tactics" and identifying six tactics); Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have We Learned from
Five Decades of Neutralization Research?, 32 CRIME & JUST. 221, 228-34 (2005) (providing an
overview of rationalization/neutralization theory and its place in criminology).
1196 [Vol. 68:5:1191
NEW HARM PARADIGM
to rationalize their behavior in order to commit unethical or criminal
acts. This part also demonstrates how overcriminalization
delegitimizes criminal law, which fuels rationalizations and increases
anti-normative behavior. Part IV brings the theoretical and practical
together through the Yates case. A close look at the facts reveals that
overcriminalization helped create an environment rich with
rationalizations, which Yates employed as part of his pre-act mental
process, thereby allowing his criminal behavior to proceed without
disrupting the belief that he did nothing wrong.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION
Before addressing what this Article contends is a new paradigm
of overcriminalization, it is necessary to understand the current one. As
others have commented, the "[over]criminalization phenomenon has
been the topic of legal scholarship for years."22 That scholarship has
attempted to define overcriminalization and catalog its "vices,"23
usually followed by proposals to rectify them.24 This Article begins along
a similar path, except that its aim is not to offer solutions, but instead
to provide the background necessary to understand the full scope of
overcriminalization's harms.
A. Defining Overcriminalization
For a phenomenon that has received so much sustained
attention by legal scholars, identifying an accepted definition of
overcriminalization is surprisingly difficult. In the Introduction, this
Article offered one possible definition,25 but it is by no means definitive.
Douglas Husak's version-"too much punishment, too many crimes"-
is popular and probably the most succinct.26 Paul Larkin also offers a
tidy definition: "the overuse and misuse of the criminal law to punish
22. Luna, supra note 9, at 712. See also Sanford Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization,
7 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 17, 18 (1968) (commenting that unless overcriminalization was addressed, "some
of the most besetting problems of criminal-law administration are bound to continue').
23. Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags
to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005).
24. Recent scholarship on overcriminalization can be found in three symposia volumes. See
Symposium on Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 525 (2012); Symposium,
Overcriminalization 2.0: Developing Consensus Solutions, 7 J.L. EcON. & POL'Y 565 (2011);
Symposium, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005).
25. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
26. HUSAK, supra note 10, at 4.
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conduct traditionally deemed morally blameless."27 While these
definitions benefit from brevity, they also fail to do justice to the broad
array of issues that overcriminalization encompasses.
That breadth has caused others to take a more expansive
definitional approach. Erik Luna, one of the most innovative scholars
working in the area, suggests overcriminalization includes a range of
concerns, such as what should be denominated as a crime, when crime
should be enforced, who falls within the law's strictures, and what are
the proper punishments for classes of crimes and in specific cases.28
This long list leads Luna to define overcriminalization as "a broad
phenomenon encompassing a multiplicity of concerns but always
involving the unjustifiable use of the criminal justice system."29 While
this definition has its benefits, it too is somewhat unsatisfying. The lack
of specifics invites so many follow-up questions that it somewhat
defeats the purpose.
Another option is to define overcriminalization through
numerics. Instead of trying to fully encapsulate Luna's multiplicity of
concerns, statistics are used to illustrate the concept. A 2010 joint
report by the Heritage Foundation and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers took this approach, defining
overcriminalization as numerical proliferation.30 Relying on data
compiled by John Baker, the report found that at the end of 2007 there
were at least 4,450 federal criminal statutes.31 Assuming approximately
50 new statutes are added each year, which is in line with the modern
average, the current total is around 5,000.32 Add to that at least
10,000-but possibly upwards of 300,000-federal administrative
regulations that can be enforced criminally, and the massive size of the
27. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The Proper and
Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 745 (2014).
28. Luna, supra note 9, at 712-13.
29. Id. at 718.
30. BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL
DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: How CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT
REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 6 (2010), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf media/2010/pdf/
WithoutIntentjlo-res.pdf [http://perma.cc/332Y-SN4K] (citing John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the
Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, 26 LEGAL MEMO. 1, 1-2 (2008)).
31. Id.
32. See John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, 26 LEGAL
MEMO. 1, 1-2 (2008) (finding that Congress creates approximately five hundred crimes per
decade); Shana-Tara Regon, White Collar Crime Policy, CHAMPION (Sept. 2014). Between 2000 and
2007, Congress created, on average, one new crime per week, for each week of each year. See Baker,
supra note 32, at 2.
[Vol. 68:5:11911198
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criminal code becomes clear.33 And that is just federal crimes. No one
suggests state criminal law is any better.34 This is definition by scale.
Although astonishing, the existence of an extreme number of
criminal provisions fails to tell the story of what overcriminalization
really is. Almost all agree there are too many laws on the books, and
their reach is too broad, but that does not necessarily make clear what
are overcriminalization's defining features.35 Stephen Smith argues
that the "conventional account" of overcriminalization is incomplete
because it is based primarily on quantitative assessment.36 He
advocates for a qualitative understanding, defining the phenomenon
not only as the proliferation of criminal law, but also as the degradation
of its quality.37 Smith sees overcriminalization's defining characteristic
as an undermining of the effort "to provide just and proportional
punishments for offenses."38
While Smith's approach is better than simply offering numerical
tallies, and it adds specificity that broader definitions lack, it does have
some weaknesses. For one, although it is more specific than Luna's
definition, it still retains vague terms.39 Also, the definition requires a
host of examples in support, making it necessarily anecdotal. Smith is
careful to use "practically important"40 examples as an aid to bolstering
his definition,41 but others simply catalog the absurd, apparently
hoping to shock the reader into an understanding. 42 While this has some
33. Ellen S. Podgor, Introduction: Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing
Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 531 n.10 (2012). See also Stuntz, supra note 20, at
513-14 (explaining growth of the criminal code).
34. See Luna, supra note 9, at 713 (citing Stuntz, supra note 20, at 515). Stephen Smith has
said that "in some respects, overcriminalization may be even more entrenched at the state level."
Smith, supra note 10, at 542. However, he also notes that states may be in the best position to slow
and even reverse overcriminalization. Id. at 542-43.
35. Smith, supra note 10, at 540. But see Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking
Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2012) (providing empirical
support for the argument that the number of federal crimes has had little effect in the "real world
of federal criminal justice enforcement").
36. Smith, supra note 10, at 539.
37. Id. at 540.
38. Id.
39. Id. (discussing overcriminalization's qualitative dimensions in terms of quality, justness,
and proportionality).
40. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 517.
41. See Smith, supra note 10, at 555-62. See also Beale, supra note 23, at 750-65 (discussing
examples related to state regulation of individual morality); Stuntz, supra note 20, at 517
(discussing examples from federal law regarding fraud and misrepresentation).
42. See HUSAK, supra note 10, at 35 (cataloging offenses that fail to pass the "laugh test");
Luna, supra note 9, at 704 (providing "motley assortment" of criminalized conduct, including
training a bear to wrestle and selling perfume as a beverage); Stuntz, supra note 20, at 515-17
(providing examples of punishable criminal offenses, including tearing off a mattress tag or using
the image of "Woodsy Owl").
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rhetorical value-indeed, the Yates case is full of absurd examples and
hypotheticalS43-it also leaves those searching for a reasonable
definition concerned that the whole matter is overstated.44
Possibly as a reaction to that concern, overcriminalization is
often discussed in terms of what it does, rather than what it is. Smith's
definition is partly of this character; so is Sara Sun Beale's. She defines
overcriminalization as a series of "vices," finding its common features
to include things like excessive unchecked enforcement discretion,
disparity among offenders, potential for abuse by enforcement
authorities, potential to undermine significant criminal law values and
procedural protections, and misdirection of scarce resources.45 Most
scholars analyzing overcriminalization do the same, worrying less
about an all-encompassing definition than about its effects.46
Practitioners follow a similar tack. The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers explains that overcriminalization can take
many forms and then defines it by how it most frequently occurs.47 The
NACDL precedes its definition with a list of overcriminalization's ills,
explaining that it "backlogs our judiciary, overflows our prisons, and
forces innocent individuals to plead guilty." 48 Although expressed in
slightly more direct terms, these are the same harms scholars identify.
43. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 6, at 35-37 (in questioning the government concerning
the vagueness of § 1519, Justice Breyer "us[ed] a ridiculous example purposely ... to get [the
government] to focus on the question of how possibly to draw a line"); Brief for Eighteen Criminal
Law Professors, supra note 13, at 13-14.
44. Klein & Grobey, supra note 35, at 5-6 (criticizing the "triviality" of examples such as the
statute that prohibits using the likeness of Smokey Bear, 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2012), because such
statutes are never actually used).
45. Beale, supra note 23, at 749.
46. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
785, 787-88 (2012); Podgor, supra note 33, at 530; Geraldine Szott Moohr, Playing with the Rules:
An Effort to Strengthen the Mens Rea Standards of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y
685, 686-87 (2011). But see Luna, supra note 9, at 712-19 (struggling to identify a comprehensive
definition).
47. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Overcriminalization,
http://www.nacdl.org/overcrim/ [http://perma.cc/9XK4-VXYR]. The NACDL says
overcriminalization "can take many forms, but most frequently occurs through:
* Ambiguous criminalization of conduct without meaningful definition or limitation;
* Enacting criminal statutes lacking meaningful mens rea requirements;
* Imposing vicarious liability with insufficient evidence of personal awareness or neglect;
* Expanding criminal law into economic activity and regulatory and civil enforcement
areas;
* Creating mandatory minimum sentences un-related to the wrongfulness or harm of the
underlying crime;
* Federalizing crimes traditionally reserved for state jurisdiction; and




So where does that leave those seeking a "succinct definition
encapsulat[ing] the overcriminalization phenomenon?"49
Unfortunately, the answer is probably unsatisfing. There are a
multitude of definitions; all have merit, but none are perfect. Yet the
search for an encompassing definition is useful because it illuminates
what seems to matter most to those thinking hardest about
overcriminalization-not precisely what it is, but what harms it inflicts.
This makes sense. Criminal law, at base, is about harm and how to
prevent it from happening to society.50 But if overcriminalization is to
be principally thought of in terms of harms, understanding those harms
takes on special importance. And as stated at the Article's outset, the
typical understanding is incomplete.
B. Overcriminalization's Typical Harm Paradigm
The seminal analysis of overcriminalization's harms comes from
William Stuntz.5 1 He found that overcriminalization has created a
"world in which the law on the books makes everyone a felon, and in
which prosecutors and police both define the law on the street and
decide who has violated it."52 Although there has been some nibbling
around the edges of Stuntz's provocative findings, no one has seriously
challenged them in the almost fifteen years since they were made.53
Accordingly, almost every scholar working in the area draws on Stuntz
when cataloging overcriminalization's negative impacts.54 His
observations define overcriminalization's typical harm paradigm.
Stuntz used both a quantitative and qualitative approach when
analyzing overcriminalization. He determined that the expansion of
criminal statutes since the 1850s, but particularly in the recent past,
has created criminal laws that are "deep as well as broad: that which
49. Moohr, supra note 46, at 686.
50. Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, 1 SUBsT. CRIM. L. § 1.2 (2d ed., 2014).
51. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 519.
52. Id. at 511.
53. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 35, at 79-80 (arguing that the problem of
overfederalization is a myth, but addressing only the issue of concurrent state and federal criminal
jurisdiction).
54. A Westlaw search shows Stuntz's article has been cited over 600 times, at least 200 of
which concern the direct issue of overcriminalization. This includes citation by the leading scholars
writing on overcriminalization. See, e.g., HUSAK, supra note 10, at 24; John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
"Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization:
Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 743 (2012); Luna, supra
note 9, at 712; Smith, supra note 10, at 537. John Coffee must be included in a list of leading
scholars on overcriminalization; however, much of his writing directly on the subject occurred prior
to Stuntz's seminal article.
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they cover, they cover repeatedly."55 Put another way, he saw the sheer
number of state and federal criminal codes as creating a set of
overlapping circles, such that a single criminal act could be treated as
though the offender committed many different crimes.56 According to
Stuntz, this feature of modern criminal law-its "depth and breadth"-
has led to three important adverse consequences.57
First, lawmaking has shifted from legislatures and courts to
"law enforcers."58 Because the criminal law is so broad, it cannot be
enforced as written; there are simply too many potential violators to
prosecute.59 Therefore, decisions about enforcement fall on the
executive, specifically prosecutors and law enforcement officers. This
results in enforcement on the street that differs from the "law on the
books."60 Stuntz contends that this is the "criminal justice system's real
lawmak[ing]."61 Government lawyers and cops are making law through
their enforcement choices, not legislatures through traditional
democratic governance or the courts through issuing opinions.
Second, prosecutors, not courts, adjudicate crime. With so many
overlapping criminal statutes and regulations to choose from,
prosecutors can charge a range of crimes governing the same conduct.62
They can charge defendants with the easiest crime to prove, the crime
with the highest penalty, or-by stacking multiple charges-both. This
allows prosecutors to enforce laws "more cheaply," thereby lowering the
cost of convicting defendants, primarily through plea agreements.63
Prosecutors are "not so much redefining criminal law . . . as deciding
whether its requirements are met, case by case."64 Regardless of the
individual decisions prosecutors make, they are de facto adjudicating
outcomes.
Erik Luna describes this consequence more pointedly: "In the
current reality of grotesque overcriminalization . . . prosecutorial
discretion is awe-inspiring."65
[Prosecutors] decide whether to accept or decline a case, and, on occasion, whether an
individual should be arrested in the first place; they select what crimes should be charged
55. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 518.
56. Id. at 518-19.
57. Id. at 519-20.
58. Id. at 519.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 506.
62. Id. at 519.
63. Id. at 519-20.
64. Id. at 519.
65. Luna, supra note 46, at 793.
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and the number of counts; they choose whether to engage in plea negotiations and the
terms of an acceptable agreement; they determine all aspects of pretrial and trial strategy;
and in many cases, they essentially decide the punishment that will be imposed upon
conviction. As such, the prosecutor is the criminal justice system, in effect making the
law, enforcing it against the accused, adjudicating his guilt, and determining the
punishment.66
The practical effects of these two consequences of
overcriminalization should be obvious. If law enforcers are the criminal
justice system, they become free to embody that system and use it as
they wish.67 The inevitable result is the "selective enforcement and
unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants."68 This does not
necessarily occur through intentional bias or vindictiveness; a
prosecutor or police officer may simply be enforcing his or her own
sincerely held view of morality.69 But that guarantees enforcement and
adjudication of the criminal law that is at best inconsistent and
arbitrary, and is at worst pretextual or discriminatory.70 Moreover,
excessive discretion given to law enforcers invites the erosion of
procedural protections guaranteed to the accused.7' Much of this stems
from the power prosecutors have at the bargaining table. Law enforcers
that make and adjudicate crime are able to exert considerable pressure
on defendants, resulting in plea agreement rates hovering around
ninety-seven percent and the "deterioration of our constitutionally
protected right to trial by jury." 72
This leads to Stuntz's third consequence, what he thought "may
be the most important of all." 7 3 It is now widely accepted that criminal
law has an expressive function, that it communicates certain important
societal values.74 As Stuntz put it, criminal law "communicates with the
66 Id. at 795.
67. See Luna, supra note 9, at 712. Douglas Husak says that "what tends to characterize
many of us who have evaded punishment is not our compliance with the law but the good fortune
not to have been caught [or] the discretion of authorities in failing to make arrests or bring
charges." HUSAK, supra note 10, at 25.
68. Beale, supra note 23, at 757.
69. Id. at 758.
70. Id. at 758-59.
71. Id. at 766-68 ("Overfederalization also increases the potential for duplicative
prosecutions and penalties, reduces political accountability, and risks overwhelming the resources
of the federal courts.").
72. Dervan, supra note 54, at 751. This does not mean law enforcers should be stripped of
their discretion, a necessary feature of the criminal justice system. But excessive discretion
stemming from unchecked power to make and adjudicate criminal law creates real harms. Id.
73. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 520.
74. Id. at 520-21. See also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 413, 420 (1999) ("The expressive theory of punishment says we can't identify criminal
wrongdoing and punishment independently of their social meanings. Economic competition may
impoverish a merchant every bit as much as theft. The reason that theft but not competition is
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regulated population (and particularly with those portions of the
population who are most inclined to do things the rest of us find bad or
dangerous), and thereby seeks to reinforce good conduct norms and
attack bad ones."7 5
If that is true, overcriminalization poses a problem because it
disrupts the criminal law's expressive message. This occurs because the
communication society intends to send by having its elected
representatives enact a criminal statute becomes garbled by selective
and inconsistent application. All those broad criminal codes that are
being variably enforced and adjudicated ensure inconsistent
signaling.76 Stuntz provides the example of a legislature passing a
tough law targeting domestic violence, which is intended to send a
message to would-be abusers that society takes the crime seriously.77
But if there is little or inconsistent enforcement by police or prosecutors,
the opposite message may be communicated-that reducing domestic
abuse is only a political tool or is unimportant to law enforcement
officials.78 Although legislators may speak the expressive language of
the criminal law, "police and prosecutors control the volume."79
Overcriminalization gives them an increasingly strong grip on the
dial.80
viewed as wrongful, on this account, is that against the background of social norms theft expresses
disrespect for the injured party's moral worth whereas competition (at least ordinarily) does not.")
(emphasis and footnote omitted). For a detailed analysis of the expressive function's role in
corporate crime, see Gregory M. Gilchrest, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 47-48 (2012):
There are two functions of expressive punishment-independent of any deterrent
effect-that are useful. First, the expression of condemnation can influence the values
of a society. Second, the failure to express condemnation through the imposition of
criminal liability, where such condemnation is widespread, undermines the legitimacy
of the criminal justice system.
75. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 520-21.
76. Id. at 521.
77. Id.
78. Id. This example is drawn from the Violence Against Women Act, which despite being
enacted in 1994 with "great fanfare," had not been the basis of a single prosecution as late as 1997,
despite that the incidence of violence against women was likely unchanged. See HUSAK, supra note
10, at 19.
79. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 521. Relatedly, as the expressive "signals" become more and
more muddled, it becomes "impossible for the lay person to understand what is criminal and what
is not." Podgor, supra note 33, at 530.
80. See Stuntz, supra note 20, at 521-22:
Or perhaps a better way to put it is this: once legislators speak, once a crime is formally
defined, police and prosecutors face the following choice-reinforce the message by
enforcing the new law, negate the message by leaving the law unenforced, or revise the
message by enforcing it only in certain kinds of cases or against certain kinds of
defendants.
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Moreover, the intended expressive signal of the criminal law
may not even reach its intended audience. With so many overlapping
criminal and quasi-criminal provisions, few people know what the law
really is.81 This is certainly true for lay people, but it is also true for
those who work in the criminal justice system.82 And even if individuals
know some of the criminal code, it is highly unlikely they know how the
code differs across jurisdictions (i.e., how different parts of the citizenry
might want to signal their unique worldviews).83 This leads Stuntz to
conclude that the depth and breadth of the criminal law means its
"messages are likely to be buried, swamped by local variation and hard-
to-discern . . . patterns."84 Overcriminalization makes it virtually
"impossible to hear what the legal system is trying to say."85
C. Overcriminalization and White Collar Crime
Up until now, overcriminalization's harms have been discussed
as universal-there has been no attempt to draw out if or how those
harms impact different categories of crimes. But that does not do justice
to overcriminalization's complexities. Certain areas of the criminal code
are more magnetic than others when it comes to the proliferation of
criminal provisions, thus inviting more of overcriminalization's
consequences.86
One of those areas is corporate and white collar crime.87 White
collar crime underwent the biggest expansion of federal law during the
81. Id. at 522.
82. Id. This group includes judges, lawyers, and law professors.
83. See Luna, supra note 9, at 719-20.
84. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 523.
85. Id. at 522.
86. For example, because the areas of food, drugs, public health, housing, transportation,
and the environment are heavily regulated, they have likely attracted outsized growth in related
criminal provisions (along with an outsized erosion of the mens rea requirement). See Larkin,
supra note 27, at 748. From 2000 to 2007, national security, terrorism, protection of military and
law enforcement, protection of children, and controls on the Internet were the most criminalized
areas. Baker, supra note 32, at 5.
87. There is a longstanding debate concerning the definition of "white collar crime." See
Gilbert Geis, White-Collar Crime: What Is It?, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 31, 31-48
(Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992) (explaining the origins of various definitions); Stuart
P. Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1,
3-13 (2004). For ease of discussion, the U.S. Sentencing Commission's approach to defining the
term is adopted. See White Collar Sentencing Data: Fiscal Year 2005-Fiscal Year 2009, 22 FED.
SENT'G REP. 127, 127 (2009) (taking a functional approach to defining the term by including most
offenses punished under the fraud, antitrust, and tax guidelines, but excluding offenses such as
simple theft, shoplifting, failure to pay child support, etc.).
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1970s and 1980s.88 It likely took the lead again in the early 2000s.8 9 A
complete discussion of why that is falls outside this Article's scope, but
suffice it to say that prosecuting white collar crime presents problems
that most street crime does not-it is harder to investigate, harder to
prove, and harder to deter.90 This has caused the law to develop in ways
to overcome these challenges, which has increased criminalization in
this area. Two developments are particularly salient here.
First, in an ongoing effort to curb economic crime, Congress has
been especially willing to pass, and courts have been especially willing
to endorse, white collar criminal statutes with reduced mens rea
requirements covering broad swaths of conduct.9 ' In a recent
congressional term, over forty percent of nonviolent criminal offenses
offered by lawmakers created carried "weak" mens rea requirements,
meaning the offenses required a mental state of less than "willfully." 92
Twenty-five percent had no mens rea requirement.93 For example, the
Stolen Valor Act of 2013 included a provision making it a federal crime
to "knowingly ... exchange[] for anything of value" any Congressional
medal or other badge.94 While the provision's aim was laudable, to
prevent the illegitimate use of military medals, it was drafted so
expansively that it covers legitimate collectors and historians.95 This
type of "legislative creation and expansive . . . interpretation of new
criminal offenses" has made it easier for federal prosecutors to combat
economic crime, but it also results in many of overcriminalization's
consequences.9 6
Mail fraud, the archetypical white collar crime, provides a more
prominent example. The mail fraud statute broadly criminalizes any
88. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 525.
89. See infra notes 105-21, and accompanying text.
90. See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579,
591-95 (2005).
91. Id. at 601-02. See also George J. Terwilliger, III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and Other High
Crimes: Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1417, 1419 (2007) (cataloging problems caused by "explosive growth in federal regulatory
prosecutions" and how changing legal doctrines have made it easier to prosecute corporations).
92. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 30, at 35-36; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal
Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI0001424053111904060604576570801651620000
[http://perma.cclSZV2-BQY5] (detailing criminal provisions offered and passed by the 109th and
111th Congress). Acting "willfully" generally means a defendant possessed specific intent to violate
the law. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 30, at 36.
93. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 30, at 13.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2012).
95. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 30, at 15.
96. Hasnas, supra note 90, at 600-01.
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"scheme or artifice to defraud" that involves the use of the mail.97 To
establish such a scheme or artifice, the government need only prove
that a defendant participated in a deliberate plan of action that was
intended to deceive a person of something of value.98 It is not necessary
for the government to demonstrate a defendant actually obtained
property, or that a victim relied on a misrepresentation.99 This breadth
has given the federal mail fraud statute "virtually limitless" reach,100
prompting one noted jurist to comment that "[t]o federal prosecutors of
white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius, our Colt
45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love."101
Another example, one directly applicable to the Yates case, is the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. After Enron's collapse and Arthur Anderson's
indictment for destroying evidence of the company's wrongdoing,
Congress was "anxious to participate in the national response" to the
"growing financial crimes epidemic."102 The act that emerged was
incredibly expansive. As Lucian Dervan explains, Sarbanes-Oxley
initiated a new phase of overcriminalization as to white collar crime.10 3
"By creating new laws and amending old fraud provisions, [Sarbanes-
Oxley] took aim at all financial crimes in an effort to increase
prosecutions and prison sentences for an enormous class of defendants,
not just the limited number of officers and directors involved in the
major scandals of the day."104
In just one part of Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress created two new
obstruction of justice statutes-18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) and § 1519.105 The
two statutes were largely redundant; they covered essentially the same
conduct, requiring only slightly different mental states.06 The reason
these "superfluous" provisions were both included in the Act is because
members of Congress were not communicating-the "rival
provisions . . . were drafted by different people at different times and
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
98. Hasnas, supra note 90, at 603.
99. Id. at 603-04.
100. Id. at 604 (internal quotations omitted).
101. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980)
(citations omitted). Judge Rakoff went on to say, "We may flirt with RICO, show off with lOb-5,
and call the conspiracy law 'darling,' but we always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341,
with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity." Id.
102. Dervan, supra note 54, at 727.
103. Id. at 726.
104. Lucian E. Dervan, Plea Bargaining's Survival: Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, a
Continued Triumph in a Post-Enron World, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 455 (2007) (emphasis added).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
106. Dervan, supra note 54, at 729-30 (comparing text of each provision).
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they both ended up in the statute."107 Moreover, Title 18 already
contained at least three other obstruction statutes.108 Yet, Congress felt
broader-worded provisions were needed to ensure "overly technical
distinctions [did not] hinder [or] prevent prosecution and
punishment."109 Senator Leahy, the architect of Sarbanes-Oxley's
criminal provisions, said that he wanted § 1519 to be a "general anti-
shredding provision" that applied to any acts to destroy or fabricate
evidence.110 As a result, there are now five overlapping federal
obstruction crimes-some redundant, all wide in scope-applicable to
white collar offenders. This, of course, is at the heart of the Yates case
and what caused an exasperated Justice Scalia to say that he
understands how overcriminalization happens, but not how it makes
any sense.'
Sarbanes-Oxley did more than add provisions to the criminal
code, however. It also raised penalties for white collar offenses. This
highlights the second way in which the law has developed to increase
white collar criminalization: punishments for economic offenses have
steadily been raised over the years. Between the introduction of the
federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 and the Economic Crime
Package in 2001, which preceded Sarbanes-Oxley, sentencing ranges
for white collar offenders were repeatedly adjusted upward as
lawmakers reacted to financial crime scandals and the resulting public
outcry.112 This upward ratcheting of punishments occurred primarily
through increases to the "loss table" in § 2B1.1 of the Guidelines, which
107. Transcript, supra note 6, at 38-39. There are other examples of the "slapdash approach"
in which Sarbanes-Oxley was drafted. A Congressional hearing in which legal experts were to
testify on key provisions of the statute was put on hold so members could vote on the very
provisions being addressed. Those provisions passed 97-0. See Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 92.
108. Dervan, supra note 54, at 729.
109. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 107-146, at 7 (2002)).
110. Id. at 730 & n.33 (quoting 148 CONG. REC. S7419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002)). Ironically,
the other architect of Sarbanes-Oxley, Michael Oxley, representative of Ohio's Fourth
Congressional District for twenty-five years, submitted his own amicus brief in Yates contending
that § 1519 should be read narrowly. See Brief for the Honorable Michael Oxley as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 1, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1075 (2015) (No. 13-7451):
Representative Oxley and SOX's other supporters intended the statute to protect
investors, to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes, including "provid[ing] for
criminal prosecution of persons who alter or destroy evidence in certain Federal
investigations or defraud investors of publicly traded securities."
111. Transcript, supra note 6, at 39.
112. See Alan Ellis, et al., At a "Loss" for Justice: Federal Sentencing for Economic Offenses,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 34-36.
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covers all economic offenses,118 but also through the addition of a series
of aggravating specific offense characteristics for economic crimes.1 14
Sarbanes-Oxley continued this trend. The statute directed the
United States Sentencing Commission, the agency tasked with
implementing federal sentencing policy, to consider revising the
Sentencing Guidelines to ensure longer sentences for securities,
pension, and accounting fraud, especially for officers and directors of
public companies.115 The Commission followed Congress's directive and
increased sentencing ranges for "high-end corporate offenders," but also
for fraud offenders convicted of crimes carrying a maximum sentence of
twenty years or more.116 Despite Sarbanes-Oxley's stated focus on
corporate directors, the latter provision affected almost all white collar
defendants because the Act also increased the maximum penalties for
mail and wire fraud from five to twenty years.117 This seemingly small
change resulted in higher sentences for a large portion of the more than
8,000 offenders sentenced under the fraud Guideline each year.118
Sarbanes-Oxley also applied the twenty-year maximum to both new
obstruction statutes.119 All of this has resulted in the average fraud
sentence nearly doubling between 2003 and 2012.120 The average white
collar sentence has similarly increased and is up thirty-three percent
between 2007 and 2011.121
Of course, not everyone agrees there is overcriminalization of
white collar crime. According to the National White Collar Crime
113. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014). The loss table increases the sentencing offense level as the loss to the victim increases. The
current table has fifteen two-level increases, up to thirty offense levels for a loss of more than $400
million. Each increase of six offense levels approximately doubles the sentence.
114. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres?: The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing
Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 387-91 (2004).
115. Larry Bumgardner, Reforming Corporate America: How Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Impact American Business?, 6 GRAZIADIO BUS. REV. 1 (2003); Bowman, supra note 114, at 432-35.
116. Frank 0. Bowman III, Editor's Observations: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and What Came
After, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 231, 233 (2003).
117. Dervan, supra note 54, at 727-28. This was more than even President Bush was asking
for at the time; he requested a ten-year maximum. Id. See also Christine Hurt, The
Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 373-78 (2008) (outlining Sarbanes-Oxley's
newly-created criminal provisions and enhanced penalties).
118. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.17
(2013), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2013/Tablel7.pdf [http://perma.cc/WA3H-TPVC].
119. Dervan, supra note 54, at 729-30.
120. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 67 (2012).
121. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, WHITE COLLAR SENTENCING DATA: FISCAL YEAR 2007-
PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 6 (on file with author).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Center, the public ranks economic crime as more serious than
traditional crime, and almost half of U.S. citizens believe the
government is not allocating enough resources to combat white collar
crime.122 Not surprisingly, the financial crisis has amplified these
feelings. Surveys post-crisis show that approximately seventy percent
of the public believes white collar crime contributed to the crisis.123
Lawmakers appear to agree. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act promulgated new criminal securities and
whistle-blower protection laws, and also expanded the universe of
entities and individuals who are subject to existing criminal laws.124 In
addition, Dodd-Frank extended the statute of limitations for securities
fraud prosecutions and instructed the Sentencing Commission to once
again review the recommended sentences for those convicted of
securities and mortgage fraud to be sure they "reflect[ed] the intent of
Congress."25
Some scholars also dispute that white collar crimes are
overcriminalized. One study found that while there has been an
increase in criminal sanctions for securities offenses, it was consistent
with the increase in the cases initiated.126 Moreover, there was no
appreciable change in punishment levels during the period.127 This led
the authors to conclude that "the data lend[s] little support to those
advocating the 'overcriminalization' of white-collar crime."12 8 At least
one noted white collar crime and sentencing jurist, Judge Jed Rakoff,
concurs, stating that, "In [the] 15 years I've been a judge, I haven't seen
examples of overcriminalization in my court."1 2 9
122. NATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME CENTER, NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 22 (2010).
123. Id. at 26.
124. Robert M. Sanger, The Dodd-Frank Reform Act and the Criminal Law, SANGER SWYSEN
& DUNKLE (Oct. 2010), http://www.sangerswysen.comlarticles/dodd-frank-reform-act-and-
criminal-law [http://perma.cc[LZ66-X4DH].
125. Peter J. Henning, A New World Begins for Wall Street Oversight, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK,
(July 19, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/a-new-world-begins-for-wall-
street-oversight/ [http://perma.cc/GD3P-XC2L].
126. Kip Schlegel, David Eitle & Steven Gunkel, Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized?
Some Evidence on the Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV.
117, 140 (2001).
127. Id. at 140.
128. Id. Another group of researchers argue there is no overcriminalization in the federal
system at all. See Klein, et al., supra note 35, at 5 ("An objective review of the evidence suggests
that the number of federal proscriptions has little effect, negative or positive, in the real world of
federal criminal justice enforcement.").
129. Bruce A. Green, Half-Baked Justice, LAW.COM (Feb. 1, 2011), http://law.fordham.edul
faculty/22323.htm [http://perma.cclX7GY-BLGV]. Many other current and former judges and
prosecutors would disagree. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 54, at 193-94; Terwilliger, supra note 91,
at 1434 (former Deputy Attorney General arguing against the "excessive expansion of the use of
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Despite such opposition, the overwhelming evidence is that
white collar crime is overcriminalized. From a qualitative standpoint,
this conclusion is difficult to refute.130 Quantitative assessment also
indicates increased criminalization of white collar crime.13 1 Thus, the
two developments discussed above-white collar criminal statutes
increasing in number and scope, with concomitant increases in
punishment-are not to be ignored. Critically, these developments
appear to have manifested themselves as harms of overcriminalization.
More and broader criminal provisions aimed at white collar offenders,
which expose those offenders to higher sentences, have resulted in
increasingly powerful federal prosecutors. They, not Congress or the
courts, make and adjudicate white collar crime. The consequent vices
have followed: excessive enforcement discretion, abuse by enforcement
authorities, disparity among offenders, undermining of procedural
protections, and misapplication of resources.132 And because corporate
and white collar crime has been the focus of overcriminalization for so
long, these harms are amplified unlike most other areas of the criminal
law. 133
This highlights an even more profound harm caused by
overcriminalization. Overcriminalization has made the criminal justice
the criminal law for technical violations of highly complex regulations"); Larry D. Thompson, The
Reality of Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 577, 584-85 (2011).
130. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Finding Room in the Criminal Law for the Desuetude Principle,
67 RUTGERS L. REV. COMMENTS. 1, 1 & nn.2-3 (2014) (collecting articles from "[n]umerous
members of the academy, former senior Justice Department officials, and the American Bar
Association" arguing that there is overcriminalization in white collar and other crime and
providing examples of its consequences).
131. See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A TREATISE ON THE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS AND AGENTS 77 (1984) (finding that white
collar criminal prosecutions rose from eight percent of the total number of federal criminal
prosecutions in 1970 to twenty-four percent of the total number in 1983); WALSH & JOSLYN, supra
note 30, at 7-10, 15-16; TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 13-14
(1998) (detailing growth of federal criminal justice system).
132. Beale, supra note 23, at 749.
133. See Hasnas, supra note 90, at 663 (suggesting the unique evolution of white collar
criminal law has resulted in it becoming a "portion of the criminal law ... significantly divorced
from the law's internal morality"). For a real world illustration of prosecutorial power stemming
from overcriminalization in the white collar context see Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization
2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON.
& POL'Y 645, 653-55 (2011). Dervan explains how prosecutors pressured Lea Fastow, wife of Enron
CFO Andrew Fastow, to plead guilty to filing a false tax return in exchange for her cooperation
and to ensure her husband stayed committed to his plea agreement. Lea Fastow was originally
charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United States, money
laundering, aiding and abetting, and filing a false tax return, exposing her to a ten-year sentence.
With two young children at home and a husband sure to spend years in jail, "the reality of her
situation removed any free will she might have had to weigh her options." Id. at 655.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
system more uncoordinated and illogical, more unjustifiable. When
society is faced with the inconsistent enforcement and overly harsh
adjudication of criminal laws, it affects how the public views the
criminal justice system as a whole. It erodes the criminal law's
legitimacy. This is one of the reasons overcriminalization is so
problematic-it "tends to degrade the quality of criminal codes . . .
jeopardizing the quality of the justice the system generates."134 Douglas
Husak puts it more simply: "the increase in criminalization is
destructive of the rule of law itself."135
Certainly this is true for white collar criminal law. Decades of
overcriminalization have left the public unsure of the criminal law's
validity with respect to corporate and white collar crime.136 The public
sees a "legal order that is deeply compromised" in this area.137 How this
happened relates directly to the criminal law's expressive function.
Criminalizing a particular economic or white collar act should signal to
everyone-would-be offenders as well as the general public-that
society deems that act harmful enough to warrant the full application
of the government's power.138 But when so many economic acts are
criminalized, and in terms that broadly sweep in conduct with weak
mens rea requirements, consistent and fair enforcement is impossible.
The signal is disrupted. 139
This has two related effects. One is that the public concludes
that unpunished conduct is actually "sanctioned wrongdoing," and is
therefore not as blameworthy as the "real crime" being enforced.140 The
134. Smith, supra note 10, at 589-90.
135. HUSAK, supra note 10, at 13. Unfortunately, testing this proposition empirically is
problematic. As Husak points out, it is not possible to conduct a controlled experiment comparing
the amount of respect for the law in two jurisdictions that differ only in the amount of law they
contain. Yet, a lack of empirical certainty does not doom the contention; there is an ample
theoretical basis supported by significant anecdotal evidence. Id.
136. See Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime
Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, and Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (2012) (finding a
disconnect between the public's perception of white collar criminal law and its reality); Todd
Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial Crisis Prosecutions,
9 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 153, 190-91 (2015) (citing Andrea Schoepfer, Stephanie Carmichael & Nicole
Leeper Piquero, Do Perceptions of Punishment Vary Between White-Collar and Street Crimes?, 35
J. CRIM. JUST. 151, 160 (2007) (findings suggesting educated and wealthier individuals have more
experience with white collar crime and perceive it to go "largely undetected")).
137. Allegra M. Mcbeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1662 (2012). See also Podgor, supra note 33, at 529-30.
138. Stuntz, supra note 20, at 520-21.
139. Id. See also Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2014) (discussing failures of the expressive function of white collar criminal
statutes).
140. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1335 (2001). See also Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal
[Vol. 68:5:11911212
2015] NEW HARM PARADIGM 1213
issue is further complicated because many white collar statutes
criminalize conduct that may not be morally blameworthy-it is mala
prohibita, or wrongful only because it is illegal. 141 This has led some to
question whether statutes aimed at white collar crime are "significantly
divorced from the law's internal morality."142
The second effect is that would-be white collar offenders do not
"acknowledge the moral culpability of their actions" because "they
develop expectations that certain conduct will not be treated criminally
even though it is covered by a criminal statute."143 Put another way, the
criminal law's signal is so confused that it causes those who are
intended to be deterred the most to not be deterred at all. 14 4 By
disrupting white collar criminal law's expressive function,
overcriminalization "undermines the integrity of the larger effort of
financial crimes enforcement."14 5 Not only does this greatly lessen the
legitimacy of white collar criminal law, it also leads to a new harm of
overcriminalization.
III. OVERCRIMINALIZATION'S NEW HARM PARADIGM
With that background, it is now appropriate to turn to this
Article's central claim-that overcriminalization's typically understood
Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining
Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 871 (2013) (arguing that not punishing white
collar crime "undermine[s] the rule of law, diminish[es] confidence in government, and promote[s]
further costly criminality").
141. Donald J. Newman, White-Collar Crime, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 735, 738 (1958)
In the first place, most white-collar laws have been legislatively-created as of a given
date, and some of them are in derogation of common-law principles. These, then, are
mala prohibita, crimes created by legislative bodies, in contrast to most of the
conventional criminal code, which is viewed as merely a legislative expression of
'natural' crimes, mala in se.;
Smith, supra note 10, at 538 (citing white collar regulatory offenses specifically).
142. Hasnas, supra note 90, at 663.
143. Brown, supra note 140, at 1335.
144. Haugh, supra note 136, at 190 (discussing attitude of some on Wall Street that
misconduct is replete and laws are unenforced (citing Ted Kaufman, Why DOJ Deemed Bank Execs
Too Big To Jail, FORBES, July 29, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedkaufman/2013/07/ 29/why-
doj-deemed-bank-execs-too-big-to-jail/ [http://perma.cclTAU4-5SWZ)).
145. Id. at 191; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 104 (2006) (demonstrating
that procedural justice, the perception that the law is being applied equally and fairly, is key to
public perception of the law's legitimacy). This Article does not attempt to distinguish between
procedural and moral legitimacy. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness
and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 213-19 (2012) (differentiating between Tyler's procedural legitimacy
and "moral credibility"). Both are negatively impacted by overcriminalization, and given they are
often mutually reinforcing, both would also serve to foster rationalizations if lessened, although
possibly in different ways and at different amplitudes. Id. at 275.
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harms are broader, both temporally and substantively, than commonly
understood. That is because overcriminalization, particularly in the
white collar context, exacts additional harm in the way it impacts an
offender's psychological process before he undertakes an unethical or
criminal act. By delegitimizing the criminal law, overcriminalization
fosters the rationalizations offenders employ that allow their bad acts
to go forward. Thus, overcriminalization not only creates more criminal
laws, but it also creates more criminal behavior, which undermines its
deterrent goals. This understanding represents a new paradigm of
overcriminalization's harms.
A. How Rationalizations Foster Criminal Behavior
To demonstrate the contours of overcriminalization's new harm
paradigm, it is necessary to understand how rationalizations affect
criminality more generally. Rationalization theory begins with the work
of criminologist Donald Cressey.146 Cressey used a study of embezzlers
to develop a social psychological theory regarding the causes of
"respectable" crime.147 Building on Edwin Sutherland's theory of
differential association, which posited that criminal behavior involves
"motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes favorable to the
violation of law,"148 Cressey determined that three key elements are
necessary for violations of a financial trust-the essence of all white
collar crime-to occur.149
First, Cressey theorized that an individual must possess a
nonshareable financial problem, i.e., a financial problem the individual
146. This Article uses the terms rationalization and neutralization more or less
interchangeably, albeit using the former much more than the latter. This is consistent with
criminological and behavioral ethics literature. See, e.g., Anand et al., supra note 21, at 10-17;
Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 234-39. But see Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques
of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 664, 666-67 (1957) (using the term
"rationalization" to mean post-act justification or excuse and "neutralization" to mean pre-act
vocabulary of motive).
147. DONALD R. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
EMBEZZLEMENT 12 (1973) [hereinafter CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY]; Donald R. Cressey, The
Respectable Criminal, 3 CRIMINOLOGICA 13, 14-15 (1965) [hereinafter Cressey, Respectable
Criminal].
148. See Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 664; see also EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 240 (1983). Sutherland, whose groundbreaking work "invented the concept" of
white collar crime, was Cressey's dissertation adviser at Indiana University. For a succinct
discussion of Sutherland's theories and how they relate to white collar crime, see Edwin H.
Sutherland & Donald R. Cressey, A Sociological Theory of Criminal Behavior, in DELINQUENCY,
CRIME, AND SOCIAL PROCESS 426, 429-43 (Donald R. Cressey & David A. Ward eds., 1969).
149. Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 147, at 14.
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feels cannot be solved by revealing it to others.150 Second, the individual
must believe that the financial problem can be solved in secret by
violating a trust, typically by appropriating funds to which the
individual has access through his employment. 151 Third, the individual
must verbalize the relationship between the nonshareable financial
problem and the illegal solution in "language that lets him look on trust
violation as something other than trust violation."152 Put another way,
the individual uses words and phrases during an internal dialogue that
makes the behavior acceptable in his mind (such as telling himself he
is "borrowing" the money and will pay it back), thus keeping his
perception of himself as an honest citizen intact.153
Cressey called verbalizations "the crux of the problem."154 He
believed that the words a potential offender uses during his
conversations with himself were "actually the most important elements
in the process which gets him into trouble, or keeps him out of
trouble."155 Cressey did not view these verbalizations as simple, after-
the-fact excuses that offenders used to relieve their culpability upon
being caught. Instead, he found that verbalizations were vocabularies
of motive, words and phrases not invented by the offender "on the spur
of the moment," but that existed as group definitions labeling deviant
behavior as appropriate.156 Importantly, this meant that an offender's
rationalizations were created before acting. As Cressey put it, "[t]he
rationalization is his motivation"-it not only justifies his behavior to
others, but it makes the behavior intelligible, and therefore actionable,
150. Id. at 14-15. Cressey explained that the problem may not seem dire from the outsider's
perspective, but "what matters is the psychological perspective of the potential [white collar
criminal]." Id. Thus, problems may vary in type and severity, from gambling debts to business
losses, which the individual is ashamed to reveal. Cressey's definition of a nonshareable problem
also encompasses tandard notions of greed. See JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE
195 (5th ed. 2002) (arguing that of Cressey's three elements, the first is the "most questionable,
for there appears to be no necessary reason why an embezzlement must result from a nonshareable
problem instead of a simple desire for more money").
151. See MARK M. LANIER & STUART HENRY, ESSENTIAL CRIMINOLOGY 168 (3d ed. 2004);
Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 147, at 14-15.




156. See id. Cressey's discussion of vocabularies of motives drew from the work of C. Wright
Mills's and Sutherland's "definitions favorable to violations of law." CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY, supra note 147, at viii.
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to himself.57 Thus, verbalizations permit behavior to proceed that
would otherwise be unavailable or unacceptable to an offender.58
Shortly after Cressey published his theories, two other
criminologists, Gresham Sykes and David Matza advanced a
sophisticated theory regarding how juvenile delinquents rationalize
their behavior. Like Cressey, Sykes and Matza found that while
rationalizations might occur following deviant behavior, they also
preceded behavior and made it possible.15 9 By rationalizing their
conduct ex ante, offenders are able to limit the "[d]isapproval flowing
from internalized norms and conforming others in the social
environment."60 Sykes and Matza called these rationalizations
"techniques of neutralization," and they believed neutralizations
explained the episodic nature of delinquent behavior more completely
than competing theories.161 Neutralization techniques-what are
commonly called rationalizations-explained how offenders could
"remain[ ] committed to [society's] dominant normative system," yet
qualify that system's imperatives in a way to make periodic violations
"'acceptable' if not 'right."'162 Rationalization theory and its core idea-
that the psychological mechanisms offenders use to rationalize their
behavior are a critical component in the commission of crime-has
greatly influenced the study of both white collar crime and business
ethics.163
157. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, supra note 147, at 94, 95. Cressey explained that his
interviews of embezzlers revealed "significant rationalizations were always present before the
criminal act took place, or at least at the time it took place, and, in fact, after the act had taken
place the rationalization often was abandoned." Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
158. See id. at 153. Cressey conducted interviews with inmates at two penitentiaries who were
incarcerated for crimes defined as the criminal violation of financial trust. Although criminological
studies such as Cressey's often rely on such qualitative interviews, concerns regarding sample
selection and generalizability should not be ignored. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 260-
70 (discussing the pros and cons of interview-based, survey-based, and quantitative rationalization
research).
159. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 666.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 667. For a catalog of mainstream criminology's theoretical approaches to
understanding the causes of crime, see FRANK E. HAGAN, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINOLOGY:
THEORIES, METHODS, AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 146 (2011). See also James William Coleman,
Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 93 AM. J. SOC'Y 406, 406-09 (1987)
(integrating multiple theories).
162. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 667. Key to neutralization theory is the concept of
"drift," which Matza developed in his solo work. The idea is that offenders are able to drift in and
out of delinquency by using neutralization techniques that "free[] the individual from the moral
bind of law and order." Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 231.
163. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 222. Criminologists Shadd Maruna and Heith
Copes state that the "influence of this creative insight has been unquestionable." Id. Indeed, Sykes
and Matza's article is one of the most-cited explanations of criminal behavior in the first part of
the twenty-first century, and their theories have been applied in a variety of contexts. Id. at 222-
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Although rationalization theory has applicability to all criminal
behavior, it has particular force in explaining white collar crime. As an
initial matter, rationalization theory has its roots in the study of
"respectable" crime. The theory stems from Cressey's ideas regarding
the verbalizations that trust-violators employ, which he identified as
the most important of the elements necessary for white collar crime. 164
Indeed, Sykes and Matza recognized that rationalizations are used not
only by juveniles, but also might be used by adults engaged in general
forms of deviance, including those committing economic crimes in the
workplace.165
More fundamentally, rationalization theory is especially
applicable in describing the causes of white collar crime because
"almost by definition white-collar offenders are more strongly
committed to the central normative structure."166 They are older, more
educated, better employed, and have more assets than other
offenders.167 These factors suggest that white collar offenders are able
to conform to normative roles and have a self-interest in doing so-they
have a "greater 'stake' in conformity" than many other categories of
offenders.168 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that white collar
offenders must rationalize their behavior through "elaborate . . .
23 ("It is clear that neutralization theory 'transcends the realm of criminology.' " (quoting Moshe
Hazani, The Universal Applicability of the Theory of Neutralization: German Youth Coming to
Terms with the Holocaust, 15 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 146 (1991))). This includes the area of
business ethics. See Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anad, The Normalization of Corruption in
Organizations, 25 RES. ORG. BEHAv. 1, 2-5 (2003) (applying rationalization theory to business law
and ethics in a widely cited work).
164. See Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 147, at 14, 16. While acknowledging his
theories were developed only to fit the crime of embezzlement, Cressey believed "the verbalization
section ... will fit other types of respectable crime as well." Id. at 16.
165. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 666; see also William A. Stadler & Michael L. Benson,
Revisiting the Guilty Mind: The Neutralization of White-Collar Crime, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 494,
496 (2012) (explaining the applicability of Sykes and Matza's theories to white collar offending).
166. Michael L. Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White-
Collar Crime, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 583, 587 (1985). Of course, defining what exactly is society's central
normative structure is difficult. As used here, it means only a law-abiding structure.
167. See MICHAEL L. BENSON & SALLY S. SIMPSON, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN OPPORTUNITY
PERSPECTIVE 51-52 (2009).
168. Scott M. Kieffer & John J. Sloan, III, Overcoming Moral Hurdles: Using Techniques of
Neutralization by White-Collar Suspects as an Interrogation Tool, 22 SEC. J. 317, 324 (2009); see
also Vilhelm Aubert, White-Collar Crime and Social Structure, in DELINQUENCY, CRIME, AND
SOCIAL PROCESS 92, 97 (Donald R. Cressey & David A. Ward eds., 1969) ("But what distinguishes
the white-collar criminal in this respect is that his group often has an elaborate and widely
accepted ideological rationalization for the offenses, and is a group of great social significance
outside the sphere of criminal activity . . . ."); Frank Hartung, The White-Collar Thief, in
DELINQUENCY, CRIME, AND SOCIAL PROCESS 1109, 1112 (Donald R. Cressey & David A. Ward eds.,
1969) (explaining differences between trust violators and "career delinquents" in using
rationalizations).
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processes prior to their offenses."169  Without employing
rationalizations, white collar offenders would be unable to "bring [their]
actions into correspondence with the class of actions that is implicitly
acceptable in . . . society."170 Not surprisingly, numerous studies have
documented the use of rationalizations by white collar offenders.171
B. White Collar Rationalizations
While rationalization theory does much to explain how white
collar criminal behavior occurs, it is also important to understand the
specific rationalizations white collar offenders employ to effectuate
their crimes. This Article highlights eight of the most prominent
rationalizations used by white collar criminals.17 2 These are also some
of the key rationalizations Yates employed that allowed him to toss
dozens of fish overboard against the explicit instructions of a federal
agent, all while maintaining he did nothing wrong.173
Denial of Responsibility. Called the "master account," the denial
of responsibility rationalization occurs when the offender defines her
conduct in a way that relieves her of responsibility, thereby mitigating
"both social disproval and a personal sense of failure."174 Generally,
offenders deny responsibility by claiming their behavior is accidental or
169. Benson, supra note 166, at 587.
170. Id. at 588.
171. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 223; see also Anand et al., supra note 21, at 40-
47 (analyzing how organizational employees perpetrate corrupt acts by using "rationalizing
tactics"); Benson, supra note 166, at 591-98 (finding antitrust, tax, financial trust, fraud, and false
statements offenders were "nearly unanimous" in rationalizing their criminal conduct by "denying
basic criminality"); Petter Gottschalk, Rotten Apples Versus Rotten Barrels in White Collar Crime:
A Qualitative Analysis of White Collar Offenders in Norway, 7 INT'L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI. 575, 580-
81 (2012) (applying rationalization theory in a study of Norwegian white collar offenders); Kieffer
& Sloan, supra note 168, at 318-24 (arguing that rationalizations are particularly important for
white collar offenders); Stadler & Benson, supra note 165, at 495-98 (listing the domains in which
researchers have explored the use of rationalizations, including occupational deviance, corporate
crime, and other forms of white collar offending); Nicole L. Piquero, Stephen G. Tibbetts & Michael
B. Blankenship, Examining the Role of Differential Association and Techniques of Neutralization
in Explaining Corporate Crime, 26 DEVIANT BEHAV. 159, 181 (2005) ("Findings from this study
also support the use of techniques of neutralization in that several of the neutralization measures
... had significant effect on decisions to commit corporate crime.").
172. Sykes and Matza originally identified five major types of rationalization techniques. See
Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 667-70. As research has progressed, some criminologists have
criticized the list as not being conceptually distinct enough. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21,
at 284 (arguing that the original list of five techniques is not theoretically precise). Currently,
researchers have identified between fifteen and twenty rationalization techniques. See id. at 234;
Stadler & Benson, supra note 165, at 496-98.
173. See infra Section IV.C.
174. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 231-32.
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due to forces outside their control.175 White collar offenders deny
responsibility by pleading ignorance, suggesting they were acting under
orders, or contending larger economic conditions caused them to act
illegally.176 The complexity of laws regulating white collar crimes and
the hierarchical structure of companies offer offenders numerous ways
to deny their responsibility.177
Denial of Injury. This rationalization focuses on the injury or
harm caused by the illegal or unethical act.78 White collar offenders
may rationalize their behavior by asserting that no one will really be
harmed.179 If an act's wrongfulness is partly a function of the harm it
causes, an offender can excuse or mollify her behavior if no clear harm
exists.80 The classic use of this technique in white collar crime is an
embezzler describing her actions as "borrowing" the money-by the
offender's estimation, no one will be hurt because the money will be paid
back.'8' Offenders may also employ this rationalization when the victim
is insured or the harm is to the public or market as a whole, such as in
insider trading or antitrust cases.182
Denial of the Victim. Even if a white collar offender accepts
responsibility for her conduct and acknowledges that it is harmful, she
may insist that the injury was not wrong by denying the victim in order
to neutralize the "moral indignation of self and others."183 Denying the
victim takes two forms. One is when the offender argues that the
175. Id. at 232; Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 667 ("By learning to view himself as more
acted upon than acting, the delinquent prepares the way for deviance from the dominant
normative system without the necessity of a frontal assault on the norms themselves.").
176. See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 168, at 320-21 (explaining how white collar offenders
blame violations on personal problems, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, or perceived financial
difficulties); Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 232; Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 667.
177. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 232 (describing how an engineer at B.F. Goodrich
failed to inform his supervisor of the reporting of false documents because he "learned a long time
ago not to worry about things over which [he] ha[d] no control"); see also Benson, supra note 166,
at 594 (reporting that an income tax offender referred to criminal behavior as "mistakes" resulting
from ignorance or poor bookkeeping). As the "master account," the denial of responsibility
rationalization necessarily encompasses aspects of all rationalizing techniques. See COLEMAN,
supra note 150, at 196-97.
178. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 667.
179. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 232.
180. Id.
181. See Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 147, at 15; Kieffer & Sloan, supra note
168, at 321-22.
182. See COLEMAN, supra note 150, at 206 (providing an example of a price-fixing offender
asserting that while his conduct may have been "illegal," it was "not criminal" because "criminal
action meant damaging someone, and we did not do that"); Benson, supra note 166, at 598
(providing an example of a bank fraud offender arguing there was no harm because "[t]he bank
didn't lose any money .... What [he] did was a technical violation.").
183. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 668.
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victim's actions were inappropriate and therefore he deserved the
harm.184 The offender claims rightful retaliation or punishment, and
then denies the victim aggrieved status.185 The second is when the
victim is "absent, unknown, or abstract," which is often the case with
property and economic crimes.186 In this instance, the offender may be
able to minimize her internal culpability because there are no visible
victims "stimulat[ing] the offender's conscience."'8 7 White collar
offenders may use this rationalization in frauds against the
government, such as false claims or tax evasion cases, and other crimes
in which the true victim is abstract.88
Condemning the Condemners. White collar offenders may also
rationalize their behavior by shifting attention away from their conduct
on to the motives of other persons or groups, such as regulators,
prosecutors, and government agencies.189 By doing so, the offender "has
changed the subject of the conversation"; by attacking others, "the
wrongfulness of [her] own behavior is more easily repressed."190 This
rationalization takes many forms in white collar cases: the offender
calls her critics hypocrites, argues they are compelled by personal spite,
or asserts they are motivated by political gain.19 The claim of selective
enforcement or prosecution is particularly prominent in this
rationalization.19 2 In addition, white collar offenders may point to a
biased regulatory system or an anticapitalist government.193
Appeal to Higher Loyalties. The appeal to higher loyalties
rationalization occurs when an individual sacrifices the normative
demands of society for that of a smaller group to which the offender
belongs.194 The offender does not necessarily reject the norms she is
violating; rather, she sees other norms that are aligned with her group
as more compelling.'95 In the white collar context, the group could be
184. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 232.
185. See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 168, at 322 (describing physicians committing Medicare
fraud as claiming the excess reimbursements they submitted were "only what they rightfully
deserved for their work"); Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 668 ("By a subtle alchemy the
delinquent moves himself into the position of an avenger and the victim is transformed into the
wrong-doer.").
186. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 233; Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 668.
187. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 233.
188. See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 168, at 322.
189. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 233; Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 668.
190. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 668.
191. See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 168, at 323.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 669.
195. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 233.
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familial, professional, or organizational. Offenders rationalizing their
behavior as necessary to provide for their families, protect a boss or
employee, shore up a failing business, or maximize shareholder value
are employing this technique.196 Notably, female white collar offenders
have been found to appeal to higher family loyalties more than their
male counterparts.197
Metaphor of the Ledger. White collar offenders may accept
responsibility for their conduct and acknowledge the harm it caused,
yet still rationalize their behavior by comparing it to their previous good
behaviors.198 By creating a "behavior balance sheet," the offender sees
her current negative actions as outweighed by a lifetime of good deeds,
both personal and professional, which minimizes moral guilt.199 It
seems likely that white collar offenders employ this technique, or at
least have it available to them, as evidenced by current sentencing
practices-almost every white collar sentencing is preceded by a flood
of letters to the court supportive of the defendant and attesting to her
good deeds.200
Claim of Entitlement. Under the claim of entitlement
rationalization, offenders justify their conduct on the grounds they
deserve the fruits of their illegal behavior.201 This rationalization is
particularly common in employee theft and embezzlement cases, but is
also seen in public corruption cases.202
Claim of Relative Acceptability/Normality. The final white
collar rationalization entails an offender justifying her conduct by
comparing it to the conduct of others. If "others are worse" or "everybody
else is doing it," the offender, although acknowledging her conduct, is
196. See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 168, at 323 (describing an antitrust offender who justified
his conduct by "saying, 'I thought ... we were more or less working on a survival basis in order to
try to make enough to keep our plant and our employees"' (citing JOHN E. CONKLIN, CRIMINOLOGY
187 (8th ed. 2004))).
197. Kathleen Daly, Gender and Varieties of White-Collar Crime, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 769, 789
(1989) (finding female embezzlers were twice as likely to justify their conduct based on family
needs than male embezzlers).
198. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME 913 (Lawrence M. Salinger
ed., 2013); Paul Michael Klenowski, "Other People's Money": An Empirical Examination of the
Motivational Differences Between Male and Female White Collar Offenders 79-80 (May 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
199. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 198, at 803.
200. See, e.g., Ron Kampeas, Sharansky, 173 Others Plead Leniency for Libby, JWEEKLY.COM
(June 8, 2007), http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/32649/sharansky-173-others-plead-leniency-
for-libby [http://perma.cclE4K6-HW46] (describing the Scooter Libby sentencing, in which Libby
submitted 174 letters appealing for leniency when facing just a thirty-seven-month sentence).
201. COLEMAN, supra note 150, at 208.
202. Id. (describing a former city councilman who explained his involvement in corruption as
due to his low salary and lack of staff); Klenowski, supra note 197, at 209-11.
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able to minimize the attached moral stigma and view her behavior as
aligned with acceptable norms.203 In white collar cases, this
rationalization is often used by tax violators and in real estate,
accounting, and insider trading frauds.204
The above discussion highlights a few additional points about
rationalization theory. First, although there seems to be a compulsion
among criminologists and behavioral ethicists to categorize
rationalizations, that there are differing types is not all that
remarkable. In fact, if it is true, as some argue, that rationalizing bad
behavior is "part of being human,"205 it follows that the list of
rationalizations will continue to grow as researchers study more
offenders in differing roles and occupations. Put another way, what is
interesting about rationalizations is what they do, "not the flavors
[they] come[ ] in." 2 06
Second, rationalizations are not "one size fits all." Offenders
employ them in different degrees, combine them with other
rationalizations, and use them at different times. Moreover, the exact
verbalizations an offender uses to rationalize her behavior will be
specific to her circumstances, because they are part of her internal
dialogue influenced by her unique environment.207 The above list
suggests that some rationalizations will overlap and that offenders may
use multiple rationalizations to fully minimize their behavior.
Finally, it is often questioned how researchers can be sure that
an offender's rationalizations are occurring prior to the unethical or
criminal act, thereby allowing the behavior to proceed, versus occurring
after the act, rendering the rationalizations mere excuses.208
Longitudinal studies demonstrate the presence of ex ante
rationalizations, yet the "sequencing question" persists in the
criminological literature.209 As to white collar crime, however, the
question need not be answered definitively because it creates a false
dichotomy. Criminologists Shadd Maruna and Heith Copes have
203. COLEMAN, supra note 150, at 208; Klenowski, supra note 197, at 67, 209-10.
204. See COLEMAN, supra note 150, at 207 (describing a real estate agent rationalizing fraud
as rampant); Benson, supra note 166, at 594 (describing tax offenders claiming that "everybody
cheats somehow on their taxes").
205. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 285 (quoting STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL 37
(2001)).
206. Id. at 284.
207. See LANIER & HENRY, supra note 151, at 169-70.
208. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 271 (calling this the "lingering 'chicken-or-the-
egg' debate").
209. See, e.g., Robert Agnew, The Techniques of Neutralization and Violence, 32 CRIMINOLOGY




explained that even if white collar offenders commit criminal acts "in
the absence of definitions favorable to them" (i.e., without using
verbalizations that minimize moral guilt), those definitions "get applied
retroactively to excuse or redefine the initial deviant acts. To the extent
that they successfully mitigate . . . self-punishment, they become
discriminative for repetition of the deviant acts and, hence, precede the
future commission of the acts."210 In other words, a rationalization may
start off as an after-the-fact excuse, but necessarily becomes the
rationale that facilitates future offending. Because almost no white
collar offenses are truly singular acts, but instead are made up of a
number of smaller acts occurring over time, there is little concern that
an offender may be employing an after-the-fact excuse that did not
somehow rationalize her course of criminal conduct. Rationalizations,
then, regardless of when they are expressed, reflect a white collar
offender's pre- and inter-act thinking.211
C. How Overcriminalization Fuels Rationalizations
Overcriminalization's evils typically have been viewed through
the lens of the enforcement and adjudication of criminal laws after the
offender's conduct occurs-these are the first two of Stuntz's three
consequences and they lead to a host of more specific detriments.212 But
that conception is incomplete because it ignores overcriminalization's
role in fueling the ex ante rationalizations that allow white collar
criminal acts to go forward. Overcriminalization not only causes
210. Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 271.
211. The persistence of the sequencing question seems to be derived from two concerns. One
is that offenders explaining their rationalizations after being caught are gaming the system by
offering after-the-fact excuses. This concern can be addressed by investigating offenders' pre-act
statements. If an offender's pre- and post-act statements are consistent, it is likely a
rationalization expressed post-act operated as a pre-act vocabulary of motive. The other concern
is that an offender may behave unethically or criminally for unknown reasons, even to herself. Any
post-act rationalization would thus be "empty," revealing little about her pre-act motivations.
While that scenario is possible, it would be odd indeed for an offender to offer an after-the-fact
rationalization that had no connection to her pre-act thinking. To suggest otherwise would assume
an offender was conjuring up a rationalization for the first time from a completely blank slate.
But, that is inconsistent with what we know-our own rationalizations related to everyday life are
not created at the spur-of-the-moment, but are drawn from well-worn popular ideologies present
in our culture. That said, human thinking is undoubtedly complex; determining the exact moment
that a thought enters a person's mind and if it changes overtime is difficult, if not impossible.
Because of this, the question of sequencing will likely persist unanswered for some time. Compare
Agnew, supra note 209, at 555, with Paul Cromwell & Quint Thurman, The Devil Made Me Do It:
Use of Neutralizations by Shoplifters, 24 DEVIANT BEHAv. 535, 547 (2003) ("No one ... has yet
been able to empirically verify the existence of pre-event [as opposed to post-event] neutralizations
212. See Beale, supra note 23, at 749; Stuntz, supra note 20, at 519-20.
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unnecessary criminal violations through increased and unjustified
enforcement and adjudication, but it also causes criminal behavior
itself.
How overcriminalization fuels rationalizations is a product of
both how rationalizations operate and where they originate. In his
study, Cressey found that the rationalizations embezzlers used to
minimize the disconnect between their behavior and their self-
perception were not "invented ... on the spur of the moment" by them
"or anyone else."2 13 Instead, Cressey found that before a vocabulary of
motive could be taken over and used by a would-be embezzler, it must
"exist as [a] group definition[] in which the behavior in question, even
crime, is in a sense appropriate."214 He concluded that rationalizations
are, in effect, swirling around in society, waiting to be assimilated and
internalized by individuals contemplating solving their nonshareable
problems by violating a trust.215
Cressey further explained that rationalizations originate from
"popular ideologies that sanction crime in our culture."216 He pointed to
commonplace sayings that suggest wrongdoing is acceptable in certain
situations, such as, "Honesty is the best policy, but business is business"
and "All people steal when they get in a tight spot."2 1 7 Once
verbalizations such as these have been adopted by individuals, they
transform into powerful, context specific rationalizations: "I'm only
going to use the money temporarily, so I am borrowing, not stealing"
(denial of injury); or "I have tried to live an honest life but I've had
nothing but troubles, so to hell with it" (claim of entitlement).218
Building on this idea, Sykes and Matza found that
rationalizations originate from an even more specific location: the
criminal law itself. According to them, great flexibility exists in criminal
law because of its variability-"it does not consist of a body of rules held
to be binding under all conditions."219 Citing defenses to criminal
liability such as necessity, insanity, compulsion, and self-defense, Sykes
and Matza viewed application of the criminal code as an exercise in
avoidance.220 They argued that if an individual "can prove that criminal
213. Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 147, at 15.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Id. Cressey argued that once antinormative verbalizations are assimilated and
internalized by an individual, they take on a more personal bent, allowing the individual to act
without disrupting her self-perception as an honest person. See id.
217. Id.
218. Id.




intent was lacking," he can "avoid moral culpability for his criminal
action-and thus avoid the negative sanctions of society."221 In other
words, if a would-be offender can latch on to a rationalizing "defense" to
his behavior, he can "engage in delinquency without serious damage to
his self-image."222 This led Sykes and Matza to one of their most
important findings: that much anti-normative behavior is based on
"what is essentially an unrecognized extension of [legal] defenses to
crimes, in the form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid
by the delinquent but not by the legal system or society at large."2 2 3 To
put it more succinctly, the law contains the seeds of its own
rationalization.22 4
If rationalizations are drawn from an offender's environment,
which includes from the criminal law itself, overcriminalization has a
significant role in fostering unethical and criminal behavior. As
discussed above, inconsistent enforcement and overly harsh
adjudication of criminal laws-the primary consequences of
overcriminalization-causes the criminal justice system to become
more uncoordinated and illogical. 225 This in turn erodes the criminal
law's legitimacy.
This perceived illegitimacy provides space for would-be
wrongdoers to rationalize their conduct. They see defenses to the law
all around them, which they then internalize and incorporate into their
own thought processes. Once this occurs, there is little stopping an
offender's future criminal conduct from going forward-there simply is
no normative "check" available to the offender because it has been
rationalized away. By weakening the criminal law's legitimacy,
overcriminalization provides an environment ripe for rationalizations,
in turn fostering the very conduct it seeks to eliminate.22 6
Overcriminalization's role in creating rationalizations may occur
at both the macro and micro level. At the macro level,
overcriminalization's "breadth and depth" results in excessive,
unchecked discretion by law enforcers.227 This necessarily leads to
selective enforcement and unequal treatment of similarly situated
221. Id.
222. Id. at 666-67.
223. Id. at 666.
224. See DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIF1t 61 (2009); Sykes & Matza, supra note 146,
at 666.
225. See supra Section II.C.
226. Importantly, an individual's acceptance of a rationalization does not automatically lead
to unethical or illegal behavior. "[Rationalizations] merely permit delinquency under certain
extenuating conditions. They do not require delinquency." Agnew, supra note 209, at 560.
227. Beale, supra note 23, at 776-79; Stuntz, supra note 20, at 512-19.
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defendants, as well as the erosion of procedural protections.228 The
public's reaction to a criminal justice system with these attributes
might be to denounce the system and its agents-"all cops and
prosecutors are 'corrupt, brutal, and unfair."' 229 This fosters the
condemning the condemners rationalization in which attention is
shifted from the wrongdoers' misdeeds by attacking others.230 The
public's reaction might also be to assume that unenforced laws are
unimportant or that breaking them is tolerable-"Everybody is doing
it!" or "There are others worse than me."2 31 This fosters the claim of
relative acceptability/normality rationalization, which justifies bad acts
by comparing them to others' conduct.232 The public could also react by
viewing the criminal justice system as rigged, either wholly or against
their identified group-"I'm the real victim." 2 3 3 This fosters the denial
of victim rationalization that suggests there was no real harm.2 34 A host
of other reactions are plausible, but almost all will foster one or more
rationalizations. Although more direct empirical data regarding the
public's adoption of specific rationalizations is needed, opinion polls
demonstrate that most people feel white collar crime enforcement is
varied and inadequate.235 And recent studies suggest that those
segments of the public most likely to encounter white collar crime deem
its detection and punishment as uncertain.236
The same thing may happen at the micro, or individual, level.
Consider one of Cressey's "respectable" criminals: the tax cheat. He is
faced with a financial dilemma that can be solved by violating a trust-
reducing the amount of taxes he must pay by failing to report some of
his income. He knows lying and cheating is wrong, and he does not see
himself as a criminal. In fact, he sees himself as just the opposite, a
228. Beale, supra note 23, at 757, 767.
229. Klenowski, supra note 198, at 56.
230. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 233; Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 668.
231. Klenowski, supra note 198, at 67.
232. See COLEMAN, supra note 150, at 197-98; Benson, supra note 166, at 594.
233. Klenowski, supra note 198, at 56.
234. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 668.
235. Donald J. Rebovich & John L. Kane, An Eye for an Eye in the Electronic Age: Gauging
Public Attitude Toward White Collar Crime and Punishment, J. EcoN. CRIME MGMT., Fall 2002,
at 4-12.
236. Schoepfer et al., supra note 136, at 160 ("More educated and wealthier individuals were
less likely to view white-collar crimes as being more certain of detection and less likely to be
punished than street crimes, especially with regard to how they perceived the criminal justice
system currently operated."). That white collar crime may be underenforced does not lessen the
opportunity for rationalizations; in fact, it likely increases it. Underenforcement coupled with
harsh penalties for those who are prosecuted increases the perceived illegitimacy of white collar
crime, thus fostering rationalizations.
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"pillar of the community, a respected, honest employee" who would
"look at [you] in horror" if it was suggested he commit a crime.237
But, if he begins rationalizing his potential bad conduct, he
starts to reconcile the disconnect between his self-perception as an
upstanding person and the crime he is considering committing. For
example, he may think about how complex the tax code is-there are
literally thousands of pages of rules and regulations.238 It is doubtful he
would even know if he was doing anything wrong (denial of
responsibility). He may also think that all of those rules, most of which
apply to others, make filing taxes essentially a game that rewards being
shrewd (denial of injury). Even if he did fudge the numbers a bit, he
might say to himself, it is not a real crime-at best it is a regulatory
issue (denial of injury). Everyone cheats a little on his or her taxes
anyway (claim of relative acceptability/normalcy). Besides, he may say,
the government only goes after big tax evaders, not hardworking people
just cutting a corner or two (claim of entitlement). In fact, he has never
even heard of a tax prosecution of someone in the middle-class (claim of
relative acceptability/normalcy). In any event, the government is so big
now it will never miss one filer's income (denial of the victim). Even if
it did, the government does not deserve his money-it is so bloated and
wasteful, he is not about to contribute to the problem (condemning the
condemners). After all, he has worked hard his whole life (metaphor of
the ledger), and he and his family should get to enjoy that hard work
(appeal to higher loyalties).
In the span of a few minutes, the would-be tax cheat has gone
from someone who would never think of committing a crime to being on
the verge of committing tax fraud. He is free to go forward with his
illegal conduct "without serious damage to his self image" because he
has rationalized his behavior ex ante.2 39
Importantly, many of the rationalizations the would-be tax
offender relied upon are available-or are available in greater
frequency and strength-because of increased criminalization in the tax
arena.240 The IRS's Tax Crimes Handbook has grown to over 150 pages
237. Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 147, at 15.
238. The Washington Times reports that, "At 3,951,104 words long, the U.S. Tax Code is seven
times the length of Leo Tolstoy's 'War and Peace'. . . twice the length of the King James Bible plus
the entire works of Shakespeare combined." Jennifer Harper, 4 MILLION WORDS: The U.S. Tax
Code Is Seven Times the Length of 'War and Peace,' WASH. TIMES, (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/15/4-million-words-us-tax-code-seven-times-
length-warl [http://perma.cc/X7KL-UCH7].
239. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 667.
240. See Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1981, 2025
(2014) (listing new tax laws in North Carolina and the infrequency with which they are charged);
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Fighting Back Against Overcriminalization, LEGAL MEMORANDUM 92
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long; there are thirteen substantive statutes and dozens of applicable
"secondary offenses" governing the reporting and collection of taxes.241
Many of these provisions, despite the criminal tax code's comparatively
strict mens rea requirements, are quite broad.242 Further, criminal tax
enforcement is lax-only about two percent of filers are audited, and
only a tiny portion of those are penalized, even less so criminally.243 This
necessarily means the IRS's criminal enforcement agents are exercising
significant discretion in what the law is and how it is enforced. Yet,
when that law is enforced, the penalties imposed are significant.244 The
result is a waning of the tax law's legitimacy in the eyes of the public.245
This leads to the many consequences discussed above, including the
(Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), June 12, 2013, at 2,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/fighting-back-against-overcriminalization-the-
elements-of-a-mistake-of-law-defense [http://perma.cc/47FQ-RLZ9] (explaining that in a "complex
regulatory regime" such as the tax code, defendants should fight back against "unwittingly
run[ning] afoul of the criminal law" by asserting a mistake of law defense).
241. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, CRIMINAL TAx Div., TAX CRIMES
HANDBOOK (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/taxcrimes-handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/
YL8J-MAP5]; Hasnas, supra note 90, at 609 (stating that secondary offenses, such as money
laundering and obstruction of justice, are "offenses that consist entirely of actions that make it
more difficult for the government to prosecute other substantive criminal offenses"). It is important
to note that many tax crimes overlap with more traditional white collar crimes, thus allowing
prosecutors significant enforcement discretion. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Introduction: Tax
Evasion as White Collar Fraud, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 207, 211-13 (2009).
242. See Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Criminal Tax Fraud: An Analytical Review, 57 Mo.
L. REV. 175, 178 (1992) ("Because the statutory definition of criminal tax evasion is extremely
broad, the decision as to who should or should not be prosecuted on this charge has been mainly
an administrative one."); Moohr, supra note 241, at 210-11.
243. Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781,
1783-84 (2001). But see Kelley Phillips Erb, IRS Investigations, Prosecutions for Tax Crimes Up
in 2013, FORBES, (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/02/26/irs-
investigations-prosecutions-for-tax-crimes-up-in-2013 [http://perma.cc/4WXE-JMZV] (reporting a
continuing upward trend in IRS criminal tax investigations, prosecutions, and convictions).
244. Hon. J. Skelly Wright, Sentencing the Income Tax Violator: Statement of a Basic Problem,
30 F.R.D. 185, 302-06 (1961) (urging fellow judges to sentence tax violators to prison terms for
deterrence purposes); Moohr, supra note 241, at 215-16 (describing tax evasion cases resulting in
multi-year prison terms); Janet Novack, Federal Judges Are Cutting Rich Tax Cheats Big
Sentencing Breaks, FORBES, (May 14, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/
2014/05/14/federal-judges-are-cutting-rich-tax-cheats-big-sentencing-breaks [http://perma.cc/
UL3M-U5PP] (reporting that the average prison term for federal tax related crimes rose from "21
months in 2004 to 31 months in 2013," but also suggesting judges are departing downward from
the applicable Sentencing Guidelines in an increasing number of tax cases).
245. See, e.g., Robert Mason & Lyle D. Calvin, Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion,
37 NAVL TAX J. 489, 489 (1984).
There is a widespread belief, held both by tax administrators and the general public,
that growing dissatisfaction with the tax system is responsible for increased tax
evasion. And unless a sense of fairness is restored to the tax system, one can expect
evasion to grow and tax gaps to widen. The basic cause of tax fraud, according to this




fostering of rationalizations to be used by "respectable" tax cheats.
Given the development of white collar criminal law, the same analysis
holds true for most white collar crimes.
IV. YATES AS AN EXAMPLE OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION'S
NEW HARM PARADIGM
Thus far, this Article has attempted to present a more complete
understanding of overcriminalization and its harms, albeit in a mostly
theoretical manner. However, Yates provides a ready practical example
of how overcriminalization fuels offender rationalizations, thereby
facilitating criminal behavior. By looking closely at what John Yates
did-and more importantly how he verbalized his conduct-
overcriminalization's criminogenic nature becomes apparent. Yates
serves as a useful and prominent vehicle through which to explore the
full scope of overcriminalization's harms.
A. Building Rationalizations-the Facts of Yates
Although the litigants spent little time in their briefs and at oral
argument discussing the factual background of Yates's conviction, the
specifics of his case are critical to understanding overcriminalization's
harms. At the time of his indictment, John Yates was a 58-year-old
commercial fisherman living in Holmes Beach, Florida, a town of
approximately 4,000 people.246 He had been married to his wife, Sandy,
for thirty-seven years and had been a member of the community for at
least half that time.2 4 7 Yates captained a boat called the Miss Katie out
of nearby Cortez, where he had fished for more than thirteen years.24 8
By all accounts, Yates was an unassuming, hardworking, and articulate
boat captain that made "a living doing what [he] love[d] to do."24 9
In August 2007, Yates and a small crew were fishing for red
grouper in the Gulf of Mexico.250 On the fourth day of what was expected
to be a two-week trip, a Florida Fish and Wildlife boat stopped them for
246. Kathy Prucnell, HB Fisher Serves Jail Time, Appeals Conviction, ISLANDER (Jan. 2012),
http://www.islander.org/20l2/01/hb-fisher-serves-jail-time-appeals-conviction [http://perma.cc/
B2SZ-HH3V].
247. Id.; Transcript of Sentencing at 8, United States v. Yates, No. 10-CR-66-FtM-29SPC,
2011 WL 3444093 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011) (No. 144).
248. Prucnell, supra note 246.
249. John Yates, A Fish Story, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/04/a-fish-story-106010.html [http://perma.cc/27KC-
5AQZ]; see also, Shepherd, supra note 4.
250. Norman L. Reimer, Whether Fish or Fowl-Prosecutorial Overreach Is a Poisonous Aspect
of Overcriminalization, CHAMPION, Sept. 2014, at 8.
2015] 1229
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
a routine safety inspection.25 1 John Jones, the field officer that boarded
the Miss Katie, had been cross-deputized as a federal agent by NOAA,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.2 5 2 After
undertaking a cursory inspection for illegal fishing gear, he saw what
he believed were undersized grouper. This prompted him to spend the
next four hours in rolling seas inspecting Yates's more than 3,000-fish
catch.253 During that time, Yates argued with Jones and questioned how
he was measuring the grouper.254 Ultimately, Jones found seventy-two
fish below the twenty-inch limit, 2 5 5 the smallest of which was eighteen
and three-quarters inches.256
After his inspection was complete, Officer Jones issued Yates a
civil citation for harvesting undersized fish, subjecting Yates to a fine
or the possible suspension of his fishing permits.257 Before leaving the
Miss Katie, Jones put the seventy-two undersized fish in wooden crates,
which were then placed inside the boat's "fish box," a large cooler that
stored the entire catch, as well as provisions for the crew.2 58 Jones did
not secure the crates or the fish box with evidence tape, nor did he mark
the fish in any way.25 9 He ordered Yates to return to port the next day,
where the fish would be destroyed.260
When the boat returned to the docks in Cortez two days later,
another officer from a different federal agency met the crew to further
inspect the catch.261 Yates was asked whether he had all the suspect
fish in the crates, and he told the officer that he did.2 62 However, when
Officer Jones inspected the catch a day later-during which Yates and
his wife both argued with Jones and other officers over their method of
measurement-only sixty-nine grouper were found to be less than
twenty inches in length.263 Believing Yates had switched the undersized
fish before returning to port, the officers questioned the crew.2 64 After
251. Transcript of Jury Trial, Day Two at 9, United States v. Yates, 2011 WL 3444093 (No.
141); Reimer, supra note 249; Yates, supra note 249.
252. Yates, supra note 249.
253. Id.
254. Transcript of Jury Trial, Day Two, supra note 251, at 126.
255. Yates, supra note 249.
256. Reimer, supra note 250.
257. Id.
258. Id.; see also Brief of the United States at 7, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015)
(No. 13-7451).
259. Brief of the United States, supra note 258.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 8.
262. Id.
263. Reimer, supra note 250.
264. Brief of the United States, supra note 258, at 8.
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four hours of questioning, one of the crewmembers said that Yates had
ordered him to throw the undersized grouper overboard.265 The
crewmember reported that Yates told the crew that "he [Yates] wasn't
stupid, [and] that if the [officers] wanted to make sure that the fish were
still [on board], they should have put a mark on their foreheads."266
Seven months later, Yates was indicted for three crimes:
destroying property to prevent a federal seizure in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2232(a); destroying the undersized fish-a "tangible object"-to
impede an investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519; and making a
false statement to a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1001(a)(2).267 Represented by a federal defender, Yates refused to plead
guilty and insisted on going to trial.2 68 After hearing two days of
testimony, a jury convicted Yates of both obstruction charges but
acquitted him of lying to a federal officer.269 Although the government
requested that Yates be sentenced to twenty-one to twenty-seven
months in prison, the judge departed downward from the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range and ordered Yates imprisoned for just
thirty days.270 Yates's appeal to the Eleventh Circuit failed, but on April
21, 2014-almost seven years after his boat was boarded-the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.271 The case made national headlines as the
media played up both its silly and serious aspects.272 The Court's 5-4
plurality decision overturned Yates's conviction.273
B. Expressing Rationalizations-Yates's Pre- and Post-Act Statements
While the above facts begin to paint a picture of who John Yates
is and what might have motivated his behavior aboard the Miss Katie,
much is left to speculation. There is, however, a more direct source
indicating what caused Yates's actions: his own statements. Although
265. Id.; Transcript of Jury Trial, Day Two, supra note 251, at 39.
266. Brief of the United States, supra note 258, at 7. It should be noted that Yates contended
at trial that the crewmember, a novice fisherman, was either lying or was coerced by the
government. See Transcript of Jury Trial, Day Two, supra note 251, at 246.
267. Brief of the United States, supra note 258, at 8.
268. See Prucnell, supra note 246.
269. Brief of the United States, supra note 258, at 9.
270. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 247, at 70-71. Just before imposing the sentence,
the judge commented that "both sides made a federal case out of this thing," but "in the process,
people lost sight of some common sense." Id. at 70.
271. Brief of the United States, supra note 258, at 1, 10.
272. See, e.g., Amy Howe, Justices Take the Measure of Fish Case: In Plain English,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/justices-take-the-measure-of-
fish-case-in-plain-english [http://perma.cc/25EG-K6YD].
273. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1089 (2015).
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he did not testify at trial, Yates did allocute during his sentencing
hearing. When asked by the judge whether he had anything to say on
his own behalf, Yates commented that he had been fishing for fifteen
years and had never seen NOAA board a boat and find a violation, but
then leave the evidence.274 He concluded by saying, "By them not doing
their job, I feel I'm in this courthouse today."2 75
In addition, just before the Supreme Court decided to take his
case, Yates published an article on the website Politico titled "A Fish
Story."2 7 6 Although the article's main objective was to support his cert
petition, it provides direct insight into Yates's view of his case, his
actions, and his adversaries.277
The article begins by describing what happened on the Miss
Katie. Yates makes special note of Officer Jones's status as a cross-
deputized agent, how Jones sorted through 3,000 fish to find seventy-
two that were undersized, and that he was issued a civil citation by
armed federal agents.278 He also describes being arrested at his home
for destroying evidence-"yes, fish," Yates writes-and the effects it has
had on his livelihood.279 And he explains, that at most, he should have
incurred a nominal financial penalty or a restriction on his fishing
permits; but instead, "the Department of Justice wanted a pound of
flesh."280
Throughout the article, Yates describes his case as a battle
between an overreaching government and the common man. He says
things like, the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act was never intended to attack
unassuming, hardworking Americans" and "Congress hoped [the Act]
would impede future criminal infractions on Wall Street, not civil
infractions . .. let alone over something as minor as three fish."2 8 1 In
one of the more combative paragraphs, Yates states that the "DOJ's
274. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 247, at 52.
275. Id.
276. Yates, supra note 249.
277. Although certainly not as structured, Yates's statements offer data similar to what
Cressey solicited during his interviews of convicted embezzlers. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY, supra note 147, at 153.
278. Yates, supra note 249.
279. Id. (stating that he has been blacklisted by boat owners and is "now unable to make a
living doing what I love to do").
280. Id.
281. Id. Although the charges against Yates have been framed by him (and subsequently
reported by the media) as centering around three undersized fish, the evidence at trial suggested
Yates and his crew threw the entire crate of seventy-two undersized fish overboard. See Transcript
of Jury Trial, Day Two, supra note 251, at 39; Brief of the United States, supra note 258, at 8.
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criminal indictment against [him was] an inappropriate and insulting
expansion of federal criminal law."2 8 2
While Yates is careful not to directly attack Officer Jones or the
prosecution team by name, he does openly question the agents'
investigation methods and the prosecutors' charging decision.283 And he
goes so far as to raise a scandal dating back almost five years in which
NOAA's director of law enforcement was reprimanded for destroying
agency documents.284 The article concludes with the following
paragraph: "It says something about federal criminal law that it can be
used against unassuming, hardworking Americans for a state civil
matter. It says something else that federal officials can trespass those
same laws with impunity."285
C. Employing Rationalizations-Yates's Verbalizations
Allow His Conduct to Proceed
Taking the statements Yates made in the Politico article
together with those made as part of his court case, it becomes clear that
rationalizations played a significant role in his behavior, thereby
allowing his criminal conduct to proceed. In fact, at least five of the
eight most prevalent white collar rationalizations were employed by
Yates.286
Before addressing Yates's specific rationalizations, however,
some prefatory comments are necessary. First, despite his blue-collar
profession, Yates fits within the strictures of a white collar offender.
Most obviously, he was charged with three white collar offenses-two
obstruction counts and lying to a federal agent. All three are secondary
offenses derivative to the environmental/economic regulatory violation
of harvesting undersized fish.2 87 In addition, Yates is older, married,
282. Yates, supra note 249.
283. Id. (stating that "the agent originally measured my catch improperly and erratically" and
"the Department of Justice wanted a pound of flesh").
284. Id. Yates was not wrong about the facts of the scandal, however. The Commerce
Department's inspector general released a report in January 2010 that found "serious flaws in
NOAA's fisheries enforcement and law enforcement operations-describing an unbalanced system,
too heavy on criminal investigation, that has created a 'dysfunctional relationship' between NOAA
and the fishing industry." Allison Winter, Lawmakers Want NOAA's Law Enforcement Chief to
Quit in Wake of Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/03/04/04greenwire-lawmakers-want-noaas-law-enforcement-
chief-to-61023.html [http://perma.ccl8JRL-PHZX].
285. Yates, supra note 249 (referring to the NOAA document shredding scandal).
286. See supra Section II.B.
287. See 50 C.F.R. § 622.37(a)-(d) (2014) (specifying size limits for fish caught in federal
waters and disallowing the sale of undersized fish).
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and has a steady job in which he oversees employees and is entrusted
with their safety. All these factors suggest he is able to conform to
normative roles in society and has a self-interest in doing so.2 88 It is
therefore reasonable to assume that he must rationalize his behavior
prior to committing a white collar offense.289
Second, Yates was in a position to rationalize. Like Cressey's
embezzlers, Yates was faced with a nonsharable financial problem that
could be solved by violating a trust.2 9 0 When Officer Jones placed the
undersized grouper back in the Miss Katie's fish box without marking
them and ordered Yates not to remove them until the boat returned to
port, it placed Yates in a position of trust. By violating that trust, Yates
had an opportunity to solve his financial problem, i.e., being fined and
potentially losing his ability to fish, without disclosing it to others
outside his immediate crew. The only thing preventing him from
committing an unethical or illegal act was finding a rationalization that
allowed him to maintain the image of himself as a trusted person.291
Such rationalizations were readily available, and Yates pre- and
post-act statements make clear he employed them as part of his decision
to commit his crimes. The most obvious rationalization Yates employed
was to deny his responsibility. Just after the officers left his boat, and
as he was preparing to throw dozens of fish overboard, Yates told his
crew that if the officers wanted to make sure that the undersized fish
remained on board, they should have marked them.2 92 This statement
is a classic vocabulary of motive. It expressed Yates internal dialogue
as he contemplated his subsequent illegal act. By framing the situation
as one created by the officers, Yates relieved himself of responsibility.
This allowed him to keep his self-perception as an unassuming,
hardworking American-how he has repeatedly described himself-
intact while engaging in criminal behavior.293 The denial of
responsibility rationalization let Yates look on his obviously improper
behavior as acceptable.
Yates also rationalized his actions by condemning his
condemners. In addition to criticizing the officers' failure to mark the
undersized fish, Yates also directly questioned Officer Jones on how he
288. See Kieffer & Sloan, supra note 168, at 324.
289. See Benson, supra note 166, at 587.
290. Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 147, at 14-15.
291. Id. at 14.
292. Brief of the United States, supra note 258, at 7-8. Yates's statement at his sentencing
hearing-"By them not doing their job, I feel I'm in this courthouse today"-evidences similar
thinking. Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 247, at 52. It also demonstrates the persistent and
discriminative nature of rationalizations. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 271.
293. Yates, supra note 249.
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was measuring each grouper. This occurred both during the on-boat
inspection and back at the docks.294 Yates's criticisms indicate he
believed the officers were uninformed, incompetent, or improperly or
selectively enforcing the fishing regulations.295 This is a typical
condemning the condemners rationalization. Yates was able to
minimize the wrongfulness of his own behavior by attacking the
conduct and motives of others.29
6
This rationalization can also be seen in Yates's post-act
verbalizations. Throughout his court case, Yates questioned the
government's legitimacy in prosecuting him, even suggesting Jones was
at fault for leaving the suspect grouper on the Miss Katie at all.297
Further, in his Politico article, Yates suggested the entire NOAA
organization was corrupt because its director of law enforcement was
caught up in a document-shredding scandal of his own. Although that
has little to do with Yates's case, it allowed him to "change[] the subject
of the conversation"-by attacking others, "the wrongfulness of his own
behavior [was] more easily repressed."298
In addition, Yates relied on the denial of injury and the denial of
victim rationalizations when he argued that there were bound to be
some undersized grouper in his more than 3,000-fish catch and that the
government was pursuing him for "something as minor as three fish."2 9 9
His statements indicate he deemed possessing undersized fish to be
only a minor infraction causing little or no harm to the public.300 When
framed this way, almost any violation of fishing regulations can be seen
as warranting Yates's actions. While it is true that possessing
undersized fish is a relatively minor violation, such thinking allowed
Yates to rationalize the destruction of evidence-a serious criminal
offense-as harming no one. In fact, even after his conviction, Yates
repeatedly said that his crime was "dispos[ing] of those three
294. Id.
295. Id. ("I believe the agent originally measured my catch improperly and erratically."); see
also Prucnell, supra note 246 (quoting Yates as saying "[w]e challenged their methodology-how
they measured the fish").
296. Although less obvious, Yates's attacks against the officers also evidence an "us against
them mentality," which signals the use of the appeal to higher loyalties rationalization.
297. See Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 247, at 52-53 (when asked whether he had
anything to say before being sentenced, Yates questioned the government's procedures and
commented that the officers caused his behavior).
298. Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 668.
299. Yates, supra note 249.
300. Id. (stating that even if he had disposed of undersized fish, "the federal penalty schedule
indicates that I should have incurred a financial penalty beginning at $500 or a restriction on my
fishing permit. Instead, the Department of Justice wanted a pound of flesh").
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groupers."301 That, of course, minimizes his offenses (both factually and
legally) and those harmed by them.302
Finally, Yates appears to have employed the metaphor of the
ledger rationalization. Throughout his case, Yates portrayed himself as
a hardworking, unassuming man that was a victim of circumstance. He
highlighted his long career as a commercial fisherman, one with no
previous fishing violations.303 He also highlighted his attributes as a
husband and provider, and as a father figure to grandchildren that he
and his wife raised "as if they were their own."3 0 4 By verbalizing this
type of "behavior balance sheet," Yates is able to see his negative actions
as outweighed by a lifetime of good conduct.305 This minimizes his moral
guilt, allowing him to square his self-perception as a hardworking
American with the reality of his status as a white collar criminal.
D. Fueling Rationalizations-Overcriminalization's Role
in Fostering Yates's Criminal Behavior
While it is fascinating how Yates specifically rationalized his
criminal conduct, it is by no means unexpected. As noted above,
rationalizing bad behavior is likely part of the human condition.306 And
rationalization theory dictates that Yates must employ rationalizations
in order to commit an unethical or illegal act.3 07 But what is
unexpected-and what demonstrates overcriminalization's new harm
paradigm-is that many of Yates's rationalizations were fueled by the
overlapping and expansive nature of the law governing his conduct.
Thus, Yates serves as an illustration of how overcriminalization,
particularly as to white collar crime, may foster criminal behavior.
Yates rationalized his illegal conduct in the ways addressed
above-by denying his responsibility, condemning his condemners,
denying his victims and their injuries, and employing the metaphor of
the ledger. These rationalizations were drawn from his environment,
which included the law governing his conduct (i.e., the law surrounding
301. Id.
302. The way Yates has verbalized his actions fits squarely within the denial of victim and
denial of injury rationalizations. Here, the perceived victim was the government or the public as a
whole-both are often viewed by offenders as non-entities incapable of being harmed. See Kieffer
& Sloan, supra note 168, at 322. Interestingly, the media's inaccurate reporting of Yates's offenses,
as well as the Justices' joking during oral argument, helps strengthen Yates's post-act
rationalizations and other would-be offenders' pre-act rationalizations.
303. See Transcript of Sentencing, supra note 247, at 67.
304. Id. at 14.
305. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 198, at 803.
306. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 285.
307. See supra Section III.A.
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commercial fishing and inspection, including the related secondary
offenses). As that law became more unjustified and illegitimate in
Yates's mind, the more space was created for him to rationalize his
noncompliance. Overcriminalization's critical role was to increase that
delegitimization, thereby providing Yates with additional "defenses" to
the law that served to foster his rationalizations, and in turn his
criminal conduct.
Even a cursory look at the state of commercial fishing and
inspection law indicates that it suffers from overcriminalization and its
attendant ills. First, as a commercial fisherman and boat captain, Yates
was subject to "a slew of regulations," everything from fish size
requirements, to fishing location, to days allowed to fish.3 08 Such
regulations have been steadily increasing since the 1970s, as Congress
first sought to protect fisheries from foreign competition, and then limit
fishing due to dwindling stock populations.309 By the early 2000s, a
series of overlapping, yet ever-changing, regulations had created a
"highly-charged regulatory climate."310 Senator Barney Frank, whose
home state of Massachusetts supports one of the largest commercial
fishing ports, commented in 2009 that professional fisherman were the
"most regulated workers that I know about what they can catch, where
they can catch it, and how many days they can fish." 311 Notably, many
of these regulations carry criminal penalties if violated-they are part
of the massive universe of federal administrative provisions that may
be enforced criminally.312
But not all applicable fishing regulations can be effectively
enforced. There are too many regulations, too many fisherman, and too
few enforcement agents. This necessarily means that NOAA agents
tasked with policing fisherman (and the many state officers cross-
deputized as federal gents) have expansive discretion to decide what
regulations they enforce and against whom. Predictably, this has led to
308. John Matson, Are Current Fishing Regulations Misguided?, Sol. AM. (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fishing-balanced-exploitation [http://perma.cc/76RX-
TBMR].
309. See Robert T. Lackey, Fisheries: History, Science, and Management, in WATER
ENCYCLOPEDIA: SURFACE AND AGRICULTURAL WATER 121, 129 (Jay H. Lehr and Jack Keeley eds.,
2005); Phillip Martin, Rough Waters: History of Fishing Regulation (pt. 1), WGBH (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://www.wgbh.org/897/fishing-one.cfm [http://perma.ccl88LJ-SX3Q].
310. Petition for Judicial Review at 7, Massachusetts v. Blank, No. 13-CV-11301 (D. Mass.
May 30, 2013) (No. 1).
311. Phillip Martin, Rough Waters: History of Fishing Regulation (pt. 5), WGBH (Aug. 16,
2010), http://www.wgbh.org/897/fishing-five.cfm [http://perma.ce/8XKD-S9T9].
312. See, e.g., Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1857, 1859 (2012) (setting forth criminal penalties for violations of commercial fishing regulations);
Podgor, supra note 33, at 531.
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problems. A 2010 report by the Office of the Inspector General found "a
number of very serious issues" related to NOAA's enforcement program,
including that enforcement actions appeared "arbitrary and lack[ed]
transparency."313 The report prompted the head of NOAA to suspend
the hiring of all new criminal investigators until the agency's
enforcement procedures were overhauled.314 These actions were taken
specifically to address the "regulated communities concern of complex,
conflicting, and excessive administrative burdens."315
Despite the agency's efforts, problems persisted with how
NOAA's enforcement agents imposed regulations. In 2013,
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley filed a lawsuit
against the agency, alleging that NOAA's "draconian" regulations
imposed a "death penalty on the fishing industry ... [a]nd this from an
agency that we know already has a history of relentless and overzealous
regulation."3 16 While such rhetoric was undoubtedly amplified for
litigation purposes, it evidences a deep-seated distrust between
commercial fisherman and NOAA. Senator John Kerry has commented
that the "tensions between federal regulators and the fishing
community have reached a boiling point beyond anything I've ever
witnessed in my 26 years in the Senate."317
This was the environment Yates faced as Officer Jones boarded
the Miss Katie. After years of increasing regulation, NOAA field officers
were operating with sweeping enforcement discretion. With so many
regulations to choose from, they determined whether Yates committed
a violation and how it would be adjudicated. This level of discretion had
already manifested itself as a "consequence" of overcriminalization, a
consequence of which Yates was aware. He knew that NOAA agents
were enforcing regulations arbitrarily and with little transparency, a
313. NOAA Fisheries Law Enforcement Programs: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries & Coast Guard of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong.
3 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Jane Lubchenco, Under Sec'y of Comm. for Oceans
and Atmosphere); see also Winter, supra note 284 (describing an unbalanced regulatory system at
NOAA that is too heavy on criminal investigation).
314. Hearing, supra note 313, at 3.
315. Id. at 4.
316. Press Release, Attorney General's Office, AG Coakley Sues NOAA to Block New
Regulations that Threaten Fishing Industry (May 30, 2013), http://www.mass.gov/ago/
audioandvideo/noaa-lawsuit-transcript.pdf [http://perma.cclU676-TG4W|.
317. Ira Stoll, Obama Fishing Czar Divides Democrats: Why John Kerry and Barney Frank






view shared by many of his fellow fisherman.318 As a result, Yates
believed commercial fishing and inspection law, and the agents tasked
with enforcing it, lacked legitimacy. This is evidenced in almost every
statement he has made concerning the facts of his case-from
challenging Officer Jones's competency in measuring fish, to suggesting
his crimes were a result of the officers leaving the suspect fish on his
boat, to attacking NOAA for shredding documents unrelated to his case.
These statements demonstrate that Yates found a series of defenses to
his behavior in the space created by overcriminalization.
Second, with the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, there were at least
five overlapping obstruction crimes in the federal code that could have
been applied to Yates's conduct.319 Three of those appeared to govern
Yates's actions explicitly: § 1512(c) makes it a crime to corruptly destroy
an object so as to make it unavailable for use in an official proceeding;
§ 1519 makes it a crime to knowingly destroy a tangible object so as to
obstruct an investigation or the "proper administration of any matter";
and § 2232(a) makes it a crime to knowingly destroy property to prevent
the government from making a lawful seizure.320 All of these provisions
are broad in scope and contain weak mens rea requirements.32 1
Therefore, prosecutors had the ability to charge Yates with one or all of
these crimes and likely secure a conviction.
Consistent with the consequences of overcriminalization,
prosecutors exercised their discretion in a way that maximized their
"lawmaking" function.322 Yates was charged with two separate crimes,
violating §§ 1519 and 2232(a), for exactly the same conduct-throwing
the seventy-two grouper overboard. Prosecutors charged Yates this way
because § 1519 carries a twenty-year statutory maximum, as opposed
to § 2232(a)'s five-year maximum. But if § 1519 applied, and it allowed
318. See Prucnell, supra note 246 (Yates and his wife commented that the " 'little guys' in
commercial fishing across the country . .. are facing similar charges and being unfairly prosecuted
as criminals").
319. See Dervan, supra note 54, at 729. Prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, Title 18 of
the U.S. Code contained several obstruction of justice provisions, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503
(influencing or injuring officer or juror generally), 1505 (obstruction of proceedings before
departments, agencies, and committees), and 1512(b) (tampering with a witness, victim, or an
informant). Id. Sarbanes-Oxley created two more. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2012) (addressing "Whoever
corruptly ... alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts
to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official
proceeding); id. § 1519 ("Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations
and bankruptcy"). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a), which prohibits the "[d]estruction or removal
of property to prevent seizure," applied. Id. Yates was charged with both § 1519 and § 2232(a).
320. §§ 1512(c), 1519, 2232(a).
321. See WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 30, at 35 (defining weak, moderate, and strong mens
rea requirements); Dervan, supra note 54, at 729-30 (discussing provisions' breadth).
322. See Stuntz, supra note 20, at 519.
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for the most pressure to be levied against Yates, why did prosecutors
bother charging § 2232(a)? Because § 2232(a) carries the weakest mens
rea requirement-all the government had to show was that Yates
knowingly destroyed property subject to seizure.323 By stacking the
charges this way, prosecutors got the benefit of an easily provable
violation, with the leverage provided by a possible twenty-year
sentence. The ability of police and prosecutors to choose among broadly-
worded, overlapping statutes when charging defendants, and then to
use the threat of significant punishments to pressure plea agreements
typifies overcriminalization's ills. 3 2 4 Here, it allowed federal agents and
prosecutors-Stuntz's "law enforcers"-to both make and adjudicate
the criminal law.
Not surprisingly, this also resulted in Yates viewing the law
governing his conduct as illegitimate. Again, his statements evidence
his mindset. In an early interview, before his case was accepted by the
Supreme Court or even on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Yates
expressed his belief that the government was wrong to charge him with
obstructing justice related to a regulatory violation.325 In the same
interview, Yates referenced the growing distrust between fisherman
and the government caused by aggressive criminal enforcement.326 And
he also questioned the prosecutors' tactics in attempting to force a
guilty plea.3 27 While these statements address events occurring after
Yates's criminal behavior, they demonstrate his pre- and inter-act
thinking328-that the laws surrounding commercial fishing and
inspection, and those tasked with its enforcement, were not legitimate.
Such thinking allowed Yates to rationalize his actions and proceed with
committing a criminal act.3 2 9 While none of this excuses Yates's
323. See § 2232(a). Yates was found guilty of this charge and did not contest it on appeal.
324. See Beale, supra note 23, at 766-67; Dervan, supra note 54, at 751-52; Luna, supra note
46, at 795. That Yates was sentenced to only thirty days is immaterial. As Justice Scalia
emphatically pointed out during oral argument, it is the risk of a lengthy sentence through which
prosecutors derive power over defendants. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 27
("But [Yates] could have gotten 20 years. What kind of a sensible prosecution is that?").
325. See Prucnell, supra note 246 (quoting Yates's wife saying: "If you come up short, it's
supposed to be a civil matter. So when he got the citation, he thought, 'pay a fine and it was over.'").
326. See id.
327. Id.
328. See Maruna & Copes, supra note 21, at 271.
329. It is not necessary for Yates to have known the specifics of obstruction of justice law for
overcriminalization in that area to have fostered his rationalizations. Rationalizations may come
from specific understandings of the law or from more general ideologies in popular culture. See
Sykes & Matza, supra note 146, at 666; Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 147, at 15. All
that is necessary is for there to be a perception that the law governing his conduct lacked




conduct, it does provide a new way of understanding
overcriminalization's harms.
V. CONCLUSION
It is said that hard cases make bad law.3 30 What about odd
cases-ones that elicit equal measures of laughter and consternation
from the judges that hear them? During oral argument on Yates, the
Justices joked about the silliness of applying Sarbanes-Oxley, a statute
aimed at curbing corporate wrongdoing, to a fisherman who tossed a
crate of grouper off his boat. At the same time, those Justices struggled
with the serious problem presented by overcriminalization, a
phenomenon that exacts real harm on the criminal justice system and
those subject to it. More so than any case in recent memory, Yates
squarely placed the evils of overcriminalization before the Court.
Yet, irrespective of the final decision to overturn Yates's
conviction, the Court's understanding of overcriminalization was
incomplete. That is because the prevailing paradigm of
overcriminalization is itself incomplete. Overcriminalization is not
simply a post-act concern, i.e., one that imposes the consequences of
excessive prosecutorial discretion and disparate enforcement or
punishment on offenders after they commit an illegal or unethical act.
Overcriminalization is also a pre-act concern-one that fosters criminal
behavior ex ante by delegitimatizing the criminal law and creating
criminogenic rationalizations, particularly as to white collar crime. This
view offers a new understanding of overcriminalization and cases such
as Yates. Ultimately, Yates serves as an illustration of why the harms
of overcriminalization are so pernicious-not only does
overcriminalization lessen the legitimacy of the criminal law, it fosters
the very conduct it seeks to eliminate.
330. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 229 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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